Transatlantic rift – Europe's strategic illusion and the new US security doctrine

The United States' National Security Strategy of November 2025 fundamentally changes the relationship between the US and the European Union. The EU is no longer described as a security policy partner, but as an actor whose regulation, industrial policy, and political objectives conflict with American interests. This classification differs significantly from previous US strategy documents.

At the same time, the US is intensifying its diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine. In doing so, military and financial support for Kyiv is increasingly being linked to expectations that amount to a compromise with Russia. This development affects the EU's core security interests.

The governments of the EU member states have so far reacted with restraint. There have been no public confrontations with Washington. Instead, talks and informal mediation formats are being maintained. This line contrasts with the reassessment of Europe formulated in the NSS.

A public statement from Moscow underscores the shift. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that the adjustments visible in the US strategy largely align with Russia’s vision of the international order. The remark was reported by several international media outlets. Former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt commented that it summed up the situation.

In terms of content, the NSS identifies several areas of conflict. One focus is on the regulation of American technology companies by the EU. Competition policy, data protection, and digital laws are presented as economic risks for the US. The strategy describes the conflict not as a trade policy dispute, but as a security-related problem. Analyses by the Financial Times point to the close alliance between the US government and economic actors in the technology sector.

Another point concerns political developments within Europe. The strategy refers to support for political resistance against established institutions. No specific measures are mentioned. Political scientists see this as a political positioning in favor of Eurosceptic movements. Former EU Foreign Affairs Representative Josep Borrell spoke in this context of a political confrontation with the European Union.

The central security policy aspect of the strategy concerns Ukraine. Ending the war is defined as a priority goal of US policy. At the same time, the concept of “strategic stabilization” of relations with Russia is introduced. The strategy does not contain any assurance that the territorial integrity of Ukraine is a prerequisite for this stabilization.

Several media reports indicate that the US government is increasingly linking its support for Kyiv to the expectation of negotiations on territorial issues. There are no official demands for border changes. Political pressure is exerted through diplomatic channels and conditionality.

In security policy analysis, this line is classified as a departure from a norm-based order. Principles of international law take a back seat to power-political considerations of stability. This shift is documented in articles in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and by the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Within the US, the National Security Strategy is being critically discussed. Kori Schake of the American Enterprise Institute points to internal contradictions in the document. Michael Kimmage points out that strategic papers do not automatically determine political action. At the same time, the NSS is considered an authoritative frame of reference for executive decisions.

For Europe, this results in a changed starting position. The US is increasingly defining its security interests independently of European positions. Support for Ukraine is no longer seen in Washington as part of a common strategic line. European security policy is thus faced with the task of reassessing its dependence on American decisions.

The National Security Strategy 2025 documents this shift. It is not an isolated case, but a formalized commitment. The political consequences affect the EU in matters of defense, Ukraine policy, and strategic independence.

For Germany, the US Security Strategy 2025 results in a changed strategic starting position. Key assumptions of German foreign and security policy – in particular the reliability of the US as the leading power in Europe – are no longer tenable. Washington is increasingly linking its security commitments to its own power-political priorities and explicitly separating them from European interests.

This directly affects Germany's policy on Ukraine. The US no longer sees its military, financial, and political support for Kyiv as a joint strategic project. This increases the risk for Germany of being caught between American pressure to negotiate and European security interests, without being able to rely on Washington's coordinating leadership role.

This also has consequences for NATO policy. The commitment to provide assistance remains formally in place, but its political underpinnings are becoming more selective. For Germany, this means that capabilities for national and alliance defense can no longer be viewed primarily as a contribution to a transatlantic division of labor, but rather as an independent security policy necessity.

There are also economic and technological implications. The US strategy openly places European regulation in a security policy context. As a key industrial location, Germany is directly affected by this, for example in the areas of digitalization, competition policy, and industrial cooperation. Conflicts with Washington are thus no longer the exception, but are structurally inherent.

The US National Security Strategy is consequently forcing Germany to redefine its foreign and security policy capabilities. Not as an abstract project for the future, but as an operational issue for the present.