EMET NEWS PRESS

Russian hybrid operations driven by the GRU are escalating fundamentally across Europe, with incident rates nearly quadrupling into mid-2025. Focused heavily on NATO’s eastern flank, Moscow targets critical infrastructure, logistics, and defense industries. To maintain plausible deniability, the GRU recruits criminal proxies by exploiting migration flows. NATO has shifted to an anticipatory posture: Operation “Baltic Sentry” secures the Baltic Sea, while severe hybrid attacks can now trigger Article 5.

The cyber operation against the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) exhibits classic Iranian-attributed tactics: initial access, systematic lateral movement, large-scale data exfiltration (≥700 GB), and subsequent information operations exploitation. Despite professional execution, the compromise remained limited to administrative IT systems; no penetration of operational technology (OT) environments was confirmed. The group “Ababil of Minab” operated with high discipline and typical proxy-style plausible deniability. The incident highlights the ongoing intensification of hybrid threats against highly visible civilian critical infrastructure.

In 2026, Europe reaches a critical inflection point. Under the US National Defense Strategy “Flexible Realism”, Washington prioritises China containment and Homeland Defense, signalling a sharp reduction of conventional forces in Europe. NATO partners must now assume primary responsibility for conventional deterrence against Russia. While US nuclear extended deterrence remains largely intact, Europe faces a five-to-eight-year vulnerability window. This briefing analyses the strategic drivers, critical capability gaps and operational risks of this transition in a high-intensity threat environment.

The gradual reduction of U.S. force availability for NATO operations, combined with the strategic shift toward the Indo-Pacific, is reshaping the alliance’s operational planning. At the same time, the war in Ukraine has exposed the growing vulnerability of military logistics, critical infrastructure, and rear-area command structures to hybrid attacks and large-scale drone warfare. European NATO states are increasingly confronted with the challenge of sustaining deterrence, reinforcement capability, and infrastructure resilience under conditions of reduced American high-end support and persistent multi-domain pressure.

The independent oversight authority AB-ND issues a stark warning: Switzerland’s Federal Intelligence Service (NDB) has itself become a target of foreign espionage. Serious cyber vulnerabilities, inadequate security controls, and suspected Russian influence operations now threaten the agency’s integrity. Neutral Switzerland is increasingly drawn into the global intelligence war between major powers. Experts demand urgent reforms, stronger protective measures, and tighter controls. Without swift action, the country risks losing highly sensitive data and suffering a serious blow to its national sovereignty. A wake-up call for Bern.

The Ukraine war represents a structural break in modern land warfare. Unprecedented ISR density, mass employment of FPV drones, and electronic warfare dominance have fundamentally transformed the battlefield. Cheap, expendable systems now outperform traditional platforms, while pervasive surveillance and EW jamming render conventional maneuver nearly impossible. Both sides have adapted through rapid innovation, dispersion, and drone swarms. This conflict signals the end of old paradigms and the dawn of a new era defined by transparency, attrition, and technological asymmetry in high-intensity combat.

A partial U.S. withdrawal from Europe’s security would severely weaken missile defense and early warning capabilities against Russian threats like the Oreshnik IRBM. Europe is accelerating self-reliant solutions: Israel’s Arrow 3 for exoatmospheric intercepts, David’s Sling and SAMP/T for endoatmospheric defense, plus new projects like HYDIS² (Aquila interceptor) and TWISTER. Complementary deep-strike options include the European ELMA cruise missile and FMAN/FMC programs. Fact-checked analysis shows a multi-layered approach combining procurement and indigenous development to close critical gaps and strengthen strategic autonomy.