EMET NEWS PRESS

Three Levels of Blockade

The assessment distinguishes between a declared blockade, an economically effective blockade and a comprehensive physical blockade.

Iran has declared Hormuz closed and claims the authority to prevent or control unauthorised transits. This declaration produces political, psychological and insurance-related effects even though individual vessels continue to pass through the strait.

An economically effective blockade exists when attacks, vessel seizures, mine threats and closure warnings substantially reduce commercial traffic. Only six transits were recorded on 12 July. This figure covered all detected vessels, not tankers alone. Separately, oil and gas tanker traffic reached its lowest level since 25 May. The two figures describe different datasets and must not be merged.

On Wednesday, 15 July, the available vessel-movement data recorded nine transits, compared with 13 on the previous day. According to the cited dataset, the nine ships included neither very large crude carriers nor LNG tankers. The figure derives from a single commercial dataset and represents a snapshot rather than a complete maritime operating picture.

A comprehensive physical blockade would require Iran to prevent every transit over an extended period, including passages supported by organised military countermeasures. Tehran possesses only limited capacity to achieve this. US and allied forces can strike Iranian radar sites, missile batteries, minelaying assets, command facilities and naval units. Iran can delay and increase the cost of such operations but cannot indefinitely prevent them without sustaining substantial losses.

For the energy market, the economic effect is more significant than complete physical closure. Shipping companies do not require proof of an impermeable blockade before suspending voyages. A sufficiently high threat level already alters insurance conditions, chartering decisions and crew availability.

The Quantifiable Risk Mechanism

War-risk premiums provide a direct indicator of the perceived threat to maritime transit. Before the escalation, additional premiums for Gulf voyages were substantially lower. Following attacks and closure threats, insurers raised their rates to multiples of earlier levels.

For a vessel insured at USD 250 million, an additional premium of 0.1 per cent already produces a cost of USD 250,000. A one-per-cent premium raises the charge to USD 2.5 million. At three per cent, the cost reaches USD 7.5 million. Actual rates vary according to vessel type, operator, cargo, route and the daily threat situation.

The insurance effect begins before Iran physically prevents every transit. Each successful attack changes the risk model for subsequent voyages. Insurers raise premiums or restrict coverage. Shipowners increase freight rates. Charterers postpone shipments. Crews may refuse assignments into designated war-risk areas.

Oil prices rose sharply during trading on Monday, 13 July. Available reporting provided different figures because individual reports captured different trading times and comparison baselines. Early reports indicated an increase of approximately four per cent, while later market levels showed a stronger movement. The price reaction should therefore not be presented as a single uniform daily figure.

The previously cited 52-per-cent reduction in traffic on 13 July remains dependent on a single source. Without a second independent maritime dataset, it carries only medium confidence. The more robust finding is that overall transits, and oil and gas tanker movements in particular, fell to multi-week and multi-month lows.

Iranian Operational Profile in Hormuz

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps combines land-based missiles, drones, mines, fast attack craft, coastal surveillance and covertly deployed forces. This force package allows Tehran to adjust the intensity of its operations at short notice.

Iran can select individual vessels, monitor traffic routes, seize ships and influence commercial movement through confirmed or alleged mine threats. The IRGC does not need to establish continuous fire control over the entire strait. It targets the commercial decision-making framework on which maritime traffic depends.

An attack on one tanker affects more than the vessel directly involved. It calls military protection guarantees into question, raises insurance premiums across the operating area and forces shipping companies to reassess their routes.

Military escorts reduce parts of the threat. They can protect against fast attack craft, limited drone attacks and individual seizure attempts. A single escort vessel cannot provide comprehensive protection against sea mines, land-based missiles or attacks outside the immediate protection corridor.

The decision by several operators to avoid transit despite the availability of military escorts demonstrates the limits of the convoy model. Protection becomes operationally effective only when shipowners, insurers and crews assess the residual risk as acceptable.

Bab al-Mandab as an Attack on the Alternative Route

Following the disruption of Hormuz, Gulf states redirected parts of their exports through pipelines leading to ports outside the Persian Gulf.

Saudi Arabia uses the East–West Pipeline to transport oil from eastern production areas to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The pipeline can carry substantial volumes, although its practical export capacity remains constrained by pumping stations, storage capacity, crude-oil grades and terminal throughput at Yanbu.

Exports through Yanbu rose markedly after traffic through Hormuz was disrupted. At times, Saudi Arabia routed a large proportion of its seaborne crude exports through the Red Sea. This shift reduces dependence on Hormuz while simultaneously increasing the strategic importance of Bab al-Mandab.

Vessels leaving Yanbu for Asian markets must sail south through the Red Sea and pass Bab al-Mandab. A Houthi operation against the strait would therefore do more than threaten another international shipping lane. It would strike the alternative corridor used by Saudi Arabia to offset the disruption of Hormuz.

Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab are therefore not independent pressure points. Iran can threaten the first chokepoint directly with its own forces. Through the Houthis, Tehran can place the upgraded alternative route under pressure.

This operational logic targets the redundancy of Gulf exports. It increases the probability that available pipeline capacity will not deliver its full strategic effect.

Command Structure of the Houthi Option

Iran’s proxy network does not operate through a single uniform chain of command. Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas and Iraqi militias retain their own leadership structures, local interests and political room for manoeuvre.

For the specifically prepared option to close Bab al-Mandab, the current source picture indicates a more centralised command structure. Iran reportedly instructed the Houthis to prepare missiles and drones for a possible closure if the United States attacked Iranian energy infrastructure.

Representatives of the Revolutionary Guard deployed in Yemen reportedly control the timing of activation. Houthi forces are said to have moved systems into readiness areas and to be awaiting further instructions. These reports rely on intelligence-sensitive sources and cannot be independently verified in full through public information.

For this specific contingency, tighter Iranian operational control is more likely than during routine Houthi attacks. Tehran appears to be seeking direct influence over the timing and escalation level of an operation with global energy-market consequences.

This finding cannot be applied automatically to all Houthi activity. It does show that the general formula of indirect Iranian influence is insufficient for assessing a potential closure of Bab al-Mandab.

Function of the Other Proxy Structures

Hezbollah has no direct operational role in closing Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab. It binds Israeli reconnaissance, air-defence and ground forces on the northern front. This complicates any concentration of Israeli capabilities against Iran or the Houthis.

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad bind additional Israeli forces and influence regional mobilisation. Their military degradation reduces one pressure axis but does not alter Iran’s mine inventory or coastal missile capabilities in Hormuz.

Iraqi and Syrian militias can attack US bases, supply routes and regional infrastructure. They therefore raise the cost of a prolonged US operation to secure the strait.

The proxy structures do not function as a unified maritime force. They distribute pressure across multiple theatres and compel opponents to divide reconnaissance, air defence, force protection and precision-guided munitions.

Lebanon: Limits of a Disarmament Option

The Lebanese Armed Forces do not possess a reliable capability to disarm Hezbollah by force without endangering their own cohesion and Lebanon’s internal stability.

The LAF reflects Lebanon’s confessional structure. Shia soldiers and officers form a regular part of the armed forces. Hezbollah-aligned actors also hold political and social influence within the state system. Publicly available information does not demonstrate complete operational infiltration of the armed forces, but it does show close links between parties, institutions and confessional power centres.

A direct disarmament order could split units, trigger refusals to obey commands and escalate local fighting into an internal conflict. The principal obstacle therefore does not lie in weapons, training or logistics. Beirut lacks a sustainable political consensus for ending Hezbollah’s autonomous military status.

The LAF can protect state institutions, secure defined areas and expand its presence south of the Litani River. It can control border crossings and support international forces. These capabilities strengthen state presence but cannot replace a political settlement.

The effect on the maritime situation remains limited. Forced short-term disarmament of Hezbollah is not available as an instrument for reducing Iranian escalation options. Hezbollah’s capacity to bind Israeli forces therefore remains intact.

Hamas and Military Regeneration

Hamas combines armed units with political, administrative, financial and social structures. Heavy military losses do not automatically eliminate its ability to regenerate.

Sustainable disarmament requires control over borders, financial flows, weapons routes and local administration. Without a viable successor structure, covert cells, newly formed armed groups and criminal networks can exploit the resulting vacuum.

Hamas has only indirect relevance to the maritime escalation. It binds Israeli forces and complicates any concentration on Iran, the Houthis or Hezbollah. Its degradation reduces one pressure axis but does not directly alter Iranian capabilities in Hormuz.

China Between Stabilisation and Restraint

China stabilises Iran through crude-oil purchases and access to trade, payment and transport networks. These revenues increase Tehran’s ability to withstand sanctions, regenerate military systems and finance aligned organisations.

Disruptions in Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab also affect core Chinese interests. China imports substantial energy volumes from the Gulf. Higher insurance and transport costs place additional pressure on Chinese refineries, shipping companies and industrial operators.

This creates a dual effect. Chinese energy imports increase Iran’s endurance. Iran’s dependence on the Chinese market simultaneously gives Beijing substantial influence over Tehran’s escalation calculus.

China could delay purchases, demand deeper discounts, restrict payment channels or apply diplomatic pressure. Such measures would affect Iran more strongly than many individual European measures.

Beijing is likely to use this leverage only if the cost of prolonged escalation exceeds the strategic benefit of preserving a resilient Iran. The most probable Chinese approach combines public calls for de-escalation with continued oil imports under terms favourable to China.

Russian Support

Russia supports Iran through defence cooperation, training, technology transfer and diplomatic coordination. Shared experience in sanctions evasion and the use of opaque transport structures increases the resilience of both states.

Moscow benefits from higher energy prices and the diversion of US forces to the Middle East. An uncontrolled expansion of the conflict could nevertheless threaten Russian partners, trade routes and regional relationships.

No reliable public evidence indicates that Russia directs Iranian attacks on commercial vessels or supplies real-time targeting data for operations in Hormuz. Technical advice, intelligence exchange and assistance in regenerating Iranian systems remain plausible forms of support, but their role in specific operations is only partially verifiable.

EU Sanctions Status

The European Union has already adapted its legal framework to the Hormuz situation. On 22 May 2026, the Council expanded the existing sanctions regime to cover individuals and organisations involved in Iranian action against freedom of navigation.

On 8 June 2026, the EU listed two individuals and one organisation. The instrument has therefore moved beyond the planning stage. The operational assessment now concerns its reach, evidentiary basis and enforcement.

The measures can freeze assets within European jurisdiction, restrict travel and prohibit transactions with listed actors. Their effect increases when ships, owners or intermediaries depend on European banks, insurers, ports, classification societies or technical service providers.

Enforcement weakens outside this area. Iranian networks change owners, flags, names and management companies. Shell companies distribute control across multiple jurisdictions. Vessels can deactivate transponders, transfer cargo at sea or manipulate documentation of origin.

The existing EU framework therefore does not provide comprehensive access to the shadow fleet. It can nevertheless exclude identified network nodes from the European market and from services concentrated within Europe.

Legally sustainable attribution remains the central weakness. Intelligence can identify a network with high confidence but does not automatically meet the evidentiary standard required in court. Registry records, port documents, insurance files, ownership information and transaction data must reinforce the intelligence assessment.

Turkey: Operational Relevance to Iranian Networks

Turkey has no direct military role in the Hormuz–Bab al-Mandab axis. Its relevance lies in finance, transit and procurement.

Turkish banks, trading companies, ports and logistics connections may support Iranian or proxy-linked networks. Ankara simultaneously maintains relationships with NATO states, Russia, Iran, the Gulf states and Hamas.

European leverage is strongest when directed at specific transactions, companies, shipments and support structures. Broad political pressure would probably generate stronger countermeasures without fundamentally changing Turkey’s position toward Hamas or Iran.

For the maritime operating picture, Turkey’s broader regional policy is less relevant than verifiable evidence of sanctions evasion, dual-use transfers, financial services and logistical support for Iranian or affiliated actors.

European Military Capability

European states operate modern frigates, destroyers, mine-countermeasure vessels, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft and combat aircraft. These forces can escort commercial shipping, search for mines, provide air defence and improve the maritime operating picture.

Available force levels are insufficient for sustained independent control of both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. Europe would have to monitor, protect and support two geographically separated theatres at the same time.

Mine countermeasures provide a clearly defined European contribution. Several states possess specialised vessels, sonar systems and unmanned platforms. Clearance operations remain slow and require additional protection against drones, missiles and fast attack craft.

Frigates can defend individual convoys. They cannot guarantee continuous protection against simultaneous attacks involving mines, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones and swarming boats.

Reopening the strait through military force would require attacks against Iranian coastal positions, radar sites and command facilities. Europe does not possess sufficient immediately available intelligence assets, tanker aircraft, electronic-warfare systems, suppression-of-enemy-air-defence capability, munition stocks or an autonomous joint command structure.

US capabilities remain decisive for a high-intensity operation. These include satellite and signals intelligence, air superiority, precision strikes, missile defence, aerial refuelling and command of large multinational formations.

Prioritised Courses of Action

The initial operational priority is to establish a shared maritime operating picture and secure defined shipping lanes. Mine countermeasures and limited escort operations follow. Financial disruption and the activation of Chinese economic interests complement these military contributions but cannot replace them.

A multinational information network can combine vessel movements, drone launches, mine warnings and coastal activity more rapidly. Its effectiveness depends on whether participating states release sensitive data and apply common assessment standards.

European mine-countermeasure forces can survey and clear defined lanes. This option provides direct operational effect but commits specialised units for extended periods and requires additional force protection.

Escort operations reduce the threat from small-scale attacks and seizure attempts. The refusal of some operators to use military-supported passages demonstrates the limit of this option. Protection becomes effective only when insurers, shipowners and crews regard the remaining threat as manageable.

The EU can expand its existing sanctions regime to additional identified ships, owners, logistics providers and financial actors. These measures raise costs and restrict access to services but cannot stop all shipments.

China has the strongest economic leverage over Tehran. Activating Chinese interests in stable sea lanes could generate additional pressure. Success depends on whether Beijing judges the cost of escalation to exceed the strategic value of an economically resilient Iran.

Indicators

Activation of the Bab al-Mandab option becomes more likely if Houthi forces move additional missiles and drones toward the coast, issue maritime warnings, intensify surveillance or if Iranian liaison personnel increase their presence in operational areas.

For Hormuz, key indicators include new mine discoveries, further attacks in Omani waters, Iranian transit-fee demands, seizures of neutral vessels and a sustained decline in LNG and VLCC movements.

A Chinese attempt at de-escalation would become visible through high-level contact with Tehran, changes in oil purchases, stronger public criticism of the closure or delayed payments.

An expansion of Russian support could appear through new arms deliveries, additional advisers, joint reconnaissance or the provision of electronic-warfare capabilities.

Overall Assessment

Iran has declared Hormuz closed and substantially reduced commercial traffic through attacks, mine threats, vessel seizures and closure warnings. According to Kpler data, only six ships passed through the strait on 12 July. Separately, oil and gas tanker traffic fell to its lowest level since 25 May. The two figures measure different indicators and must remain analytically separate.

Oil prices reacted to the renewed escalation with significant volatility. Available reports cited different increases depending on the time of measurement. Early reporting placed the rise at approximately four per cent, while later market levels showed a stronger movement. Any reliable assessment must therefore identify the precise observation time and comparison baseline.

Bab al-Mandab represents the second stage of the same operational logic. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states use the Red Sea to partially bypass disruption in Hormuz. A Houthi closure would strike the principal alternative corridor and reduce the maritime redundancy of energy exports.

For this specific Houthi contingency, current reporting indicates stronger Iranian control than is typical across the broader proxy network. Revolutionary Guard representatives in Yemen reportedly supervise the activation of the operation. This assessment carries medium confidence because it relies on sensitive sources and lacks complete independent public confirmation.

China stabilises Iran through energy imports while simultaneously holding the strongest economic restraint mechanism. Russia increases Iran’s military-technological regeneration capacity but, according to the public intelligence picture, does not directly participate in the maritime blockade operation.

The EU has operated under an expanded sanctions framework since May 2026 and listed its first targets in June. The central challenge concerns scale, attribution and enforcement against globally distributed corporate, financial and shipping structures.

Europe can contribute maritime surveillance, mine countermeasures, limited escort operations and financial disruption. Priority lies with a shared operating picture and the security of defined shipping lanes. Sustained independent military control of both chokepoints remains unrealistic without US command, intelligence and strike capabilities.

Glossary

AIS
The Automatic Identification System transmits a vessel’s identity, position, course and speed.

Bab al-Mandab
The strait connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and forms the southern access route to the Suez corridor.

IRGC
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a military, economic and intelligence power structure of the Iranian regime.

War-risk premium
A war-risk premium is an additional insurance charge applied to voyages through areas affected by armed conflict or elevated attack risk.

LAF
The Lebanese Armed Forces are the regular armed forces of Lebanon.

LNG
Liquefied natural gas is natural gas cooled into liquid form for transport by specialised tanker.

Maritime redundancy
Maritime redundancy refers to alternative transport routes that can partially compensate for the loss of a primary sea lane.

Proxy
A proxy is a non-state actor financed, armed, trained or operationally supported by an external state.

SEAD
Suppression of Enemy Air Defences covers military operations intended to degrade or neutralise hostile air-defence systems.

Shadow fleet
A shadow fleet uses opaque ownership structures, changing flags and difficult-to-verify insurance arrangements to evade sanctions.

Ship-to-ship transfer
A ship-to-ship transfer moves cargo between two vessels outside a port.

Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman.

VLCC
A very large crude carrier is a tanker capable of transporting approximately two million barrels of crude oil.

References

Reuters
Hormuz traffic slows to two-month low as renewed US, Iran strikes raise safety risk
13 July 2026
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hormuz-traffic-slows-multi-week-low-renewed-us-iran-strikes-raise-safety-risk-2026-07-13/

Reuters
Oil up 9% to one-month high as US says it will blockade entire Iranian coastline, all vessels
12 July 2026
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-jumps-more-than-3-after-us-iran-launch-strikes-mideast-2026-07-12/

Reuters
Fewer vessels travel through Hormuz after US resumes blockade
16 July 2026
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fewer-vessels-travel-through-hormuz-us-iran-continue-strikes-2026-07-16/

Reuters
Iran-linked vessels pass through Hormuz ahead of US blockade
15 July 2026
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iran-linked-vessels-pass-through-hormuz-ahead-us-blockade-2026-07-15/

Reuters
Some ships refusing US-military guided Hormuz transits after attacks, sources say
15 July 2026
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/some-ships-refusing-us-military-guided-hormuz-transits-after-attacks-sources-say-2026-07-15/

Reuters
Iran tells Houthis to close Red Sea gateway if US hits power network, sources say
16 July 2026
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-tells-houthis-close-red-sea-gateway-if-us-hits-power-network-sources-say-2026-07-16/

Reuters
After Hormuz, Iran turns to Red Sea gateway as new pressure point
14 July 2026
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/after-hormuz-iran-turns-red-sea-gateway-new-pressure-point-2026-07-14/

Reuters
Saudi boosts Yanbu crude oil exports as it works around Hormuz halt, data shows
24 March 2026
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/crude-exports-saudis-yanbu-port-surged-near-4-mln-bpd-last-week-data-shows-2026-03-24/

Reuters
Maritime insurance premiums surge as Iran conflict widens
6 March 2026
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/maritime-insurance-premiums-surge-iran-conflict-widens-2026-03-06/

Council of the European Union
Middle East: Council extends EU legal framework to target those involved in Iran’s actions impeding lawful transit passage and freedom of navigation
22 May 2026
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/22/middle-east-council-extends-eu-legal-framework-to-target-those-involved-in-iran-s-actions-impeding-lawful-transit-passage-and-freedom-of-navigation/

Council of the European Union
Freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz: EU lists two individuals and one entity
8 June 2026
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/06/08/freedom-of-navigation-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-eu-lists-two-individuals-and-one-entity/