EMET NEWS PRESS

Operational Launch over Nörvenich

The exercise on 16 July went beyond the joint ground refuelling activity initially announced by German government sources. Two French Rafale aircraft and two German Eurofighters practised aerial refuelling by a French tanker aircraft. The German Air Force confirmed the completion of the exercise later that afternoon.

The operation constitutes the first publicly confirmed practical step under the Franco-German deterrence partnership agreed on 2 March. It tested procedures for combined air operations and demonstrated that French and German combat aircraft can operate within a common support structure.

Appropriately configured Rafale variants form the airborne component of France’s nuclear forces. The general nuclear capability of the aircraft does not mean that the aircraft involved in this exercise carried nuclear weapons. No publicly available information confirms the transfer or storage of French nuclear weapons at Nörvenich.

The German Eurofighter currently has no role as a nuclear delivery aircraft under Germany’s nuclear-sharing obligations. The Bundeswehr continues to perform this mission with the Tornado while preparing the transition to the F-35A. The Eurofighter can nevertheless provide fighter escort, air defence and conventional strike capabilities. Its participation therefore indicates the intended integration of German conventional forces into French strategic operations.

Political Decision-Making Schedule

The exercise took place immediately before a working meeting between Merz and Macron at Schloss Bensberg. On 17 July at 09:00, the Franco-German Defence and Security Council will convene at Nörvenich Air Base under the leadership of both heads of government. The responsible ministers and senior military representatives from both countries are expected to participate.

According to German government sources, the council is expected to approve the first participation of German military personnel in a French nuclear exercise in autumn 2026. It remains unclear whether the German contingent will act as observers or become involved in operational planning, command or support procedures. This distinction will determine the military substance of the next integration step.

A further exercise is planned alongside the council meeting. German and French personnel are expected to perform maintenance work on aircraft operated by the other country. This will expand cooperation from airborne interoperability to technical ground procedures. Deployed air operations require common standards, compatible equipment and trained personnel to sustain aircraft outside their national support structures.

The 26th Franco-German Council of Ministers will subsequently convene at Schloss Augustusburg in Brühl. While the Defence and Security Council will address strategic and military cooperation, the Council of Ministers will focus on economic competitiveness, societal resilience and joint initiatives at the EU level. Merz and Macron are expected to present the results during an afternoon press conference.

Agreement of 2 March 2026

Germany and France agreed on 2 March 2026 to deepen deterrence cooperation in response to the changing threat environment. They established a high-level bilateral nuclear steering group for this purpose.

The steering group is intended to organise doctrinal dialogue and coordinate strategic capabilities. Its work covers the interaction of conventional forces, European missile defence and French nuclear capabilities.

The agreement provides for practical measures beginning in 2026. These include German conventional participation in French nuclear exercises, joint visits to strategic sites and the development of European capabilities for escalation management. Early warning, air defence and deep precision strike are the principal operational fields.

The exercise over Nörvenich therefore implements a task already defined in March. It does not establish a new nuclear doctrine but begins the development of the military procedures required to support the partnership.

France’s Forward Deterrence

France maintains an independent nuclear dyad consisting of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and air-launched nuclear weapons. French doctrine protects the state’s vital interests, which Paris considers to have a European dimension. France deliberately maintains ambiguity over the precise developments that could affect these interests and the conditions under which nuclear employment might be considered.

Macron announced the concept of forward deterrence in March 2026. The framework enables selected European partners to participate in French nuclear exercises, conduct strategic consultations and visit relevant military facilities. French strategic forces may also be deployed temporarily to allied territory when operational conditions require it.

Control remains exclusively French. The French president alone decides on crossing the nuclear threshold, targeting and employment. Partner countries receive neither a veto nor a formal role in the decision to use nuclear weapons.

The publicly documented concept does not include an automatic French security guarantee for Germany or other partners. Paris takes European security interests into account but retains national control over the definition of its vital interests and any resulting decisions.

The term “nuclear partnership” therefore describes the integration of allied conventional capabilities into the French deterrence system. It does not signify shared ownership of nuclear weapons or a joint nuclear command authority.

Germany’s Operational Role

Germany can support French strategic air operations through reconnaissance and early warning, air defence, protection of operating bases, fighter escort and conventional precision-strike capabilities. Secure communications and technical airbase support form additional components.

These functions can increase the survivability and operational effectiveness of the French airborne component without integrating Germany into the nuclear release chain. They also allow a crisis to be managed with conventional capabilities for longer, delaying any transition towards the nuclear threshold.

German participation could also expand French deployment options. Rafale units may be able to operate temporarily from additional allied locations, provided that the necessary infrastructure, security and technical support are available.

Germany gains greater access to French deterrence procedures and threat assessments. This provides a channel for political consultation but does not guarantee German participation in the decision to employ French nuclear weapons.

International-Law and Treaty Constraints

Germany is bound by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Article II prohibits it from receiving nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as direct or indirect control over such weapons. Germany may neither manufacture nor otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

An additional obligation follows from Article 3 of the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, commonly known as the Two Plus Four Treaty. In that treaty, united Germany reaffirmed its renunciation of the manufacture, possession and control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

These commitments exclude a German nuclear weapon and joint Franco-German control over French nuclear weapons. Any bilateral arrangement must therefore remain below the threshold of shared nuclear authority. France must retain ownership, custody and the employment decision.

The stationing of foreign nuclear weapons under the continuing control of the respective nuclear-weapon state must be distinguished from a transfer of ownership or control. NATO’s existing nuclear-sharing arrangements rely on this separation. Any temporary deployment of French strategic forces to Germany would likewise have to be assessed according to whether France retains complete control.

The treaties do not prohibit German participation in conventional protection, escort or support operations. They establish a clear boundary against any transfer of French nuclear weapons or nuclear decision-making authority to German institutions.

Relationship with NATO

Franco-German cooperation is intended to complement and strengthen NATO deterrence. It replaces neither US extended deterrence nor Germany’s participation in NATO nuclear sharing.

The strategic nuclear forces of the United States remain the principal nuclear security guarantee for the Alliance. The independent British and French nuclear forces make an additional contribution because multiple separate decision-making centres complicate an adversary’s calculations.

Germany participates in US-led nuclear sharing through agreed NATO procedures, national delivery aircraft and the required infrastructure. The procurement of the F-35A is intended to modernise this contribution.

France does not participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group and does not place its nuclear weapons under collective Alliance planning. The new cooperation is therefore organised bilaterally. It connects Germany more closely with French deterrence but does not integrate France’s nuclear forces into NATO’s nuclear command structure.

Germany consequently operates through two parallel cooperation mechanisms: institutionalised NATO nuclear sharing under US nuclear leadership and French-led cooperation supported by German conventional capabilities. The two mechanisms are intended to complement each other but differ in consultation, planning and employment authority.

Operational Effects and Military Limitations

The aerial refuelling exercise provides the first confirmed evidence of direct military interaction within the new partnership. It does not change the number of available nuclear weapons or immediately alter the nuclear balance of forces in Europe.

Its operational value lies in developing common procedures. Aerial refuelling increases range and endurance, enables more flexible flight profiles and reduces dependence on individual operating bases. Reciprocal maintenance training is intended to support the ability to sustain deployed aircraft outside their national support structures.

Over the medium term, the partnership could expand French dispersal and deployment options. Additional operating locations increase uncertainty over potential departure bases and flight routes. An adversary would have to monitor and include a larger number of sites in its military planning.

A credible capability will nevertheless require repeated exercises, protected command systems and resilient procedures for political decision-making during a crisis. A single aerial refuelling exercise constitutes an initial step, not a completed operational capability.

Consequences for Nörvenich

Nörvenich hosts Tactical Air Wing 31 “Boelcke” and is therefore a major Eurofighter operating base. The Defence and Security Council meeting and the practical exercises give the base an additional function within Franco-German deterrence cooperation.

This does not mean that French nuclear weapons are being stationed at Nörvenich. The base may nevertheless be assessed in adversarial intelligence and targeting processes as a potential support or deployment location for French strategic air forces.

Such an assessment increases requirements for air defence, base protection and rapid recovery. Airfields capable of receiving and supporting strategic units can become relevant to adversarial reconnaissance and targeting even without a nuclear-weapons presence.

Any later temporary deployment of French nuclear-capable aircraft would create additional security, secrecy and political authorisation requirements. The current exercise does not demonstrate that all conditions for such a deployment have already been met.

Signalling towards Russia

The partnership is strategically directed against military coercion and nuclear intimidation in Europe. It signals that an adversary would have to consider independent French decisions and European support structures in addition to a potential US response.

Multiple nuclear decision-making centres increase the complexity of adversarial calculations. Political paralysis within one mechanism would not automatically neutralise all remaining courses of action.

Additional deployment and support options can therefore strengthen deterrence. At the same time, they increase the military relevance of participating bases and require coordinated strategic communication. Exercises and deployments during a crisis must not unintentionally be interpreted as preparations for nuclear employment.

Defence-Industrial Context

The launch of nuclear cooperation comes during a period of substantial strain affecting joint defence programmes. Following persistent differences between governments and industry, the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System lost significant parts of its previous structure. The Combat Cloud is expected to continue as a networked component.

Deterrence cooperation does not replace the failed industrial framework. It may nevertheless generate common requirements for networking, air defence, early warning and deep precision strike.

The emergence of viable joint procurement programmes will depend on limiting them to technically achievable projects. Diverging operational requirements, industrial leadership claims and national export policies remain structural constraints.

Glossary

Aerial refuelling
The transfer of fuel from a tanker aircraft to another aircraft during flight in order to extend range, endurance or operational flexibility.

Combat Cloud
A digital command and communications network connecting sensors, effectors and military platforms within a common operational system.

Deterrence
A strategy intended to prevent attack or escalation by credibly threatening costs that an adversary would consider unacceptable.

Dual-Capable Aircraft
A combat aircraft capable of conducting both conventional and nuclear missions.

Escalation management
The political and military control of a crisis intended to constrain adversarial action and prevent an uncontrolled transition to a higher level of conflict.

Eurofighter
A multirole combat aircraft employed by Germany primarily for air defence, strike and reconnaissance missions.

FCAS
A Franco-German-Spanish programme for a networked future air combat system comprising crewed and uncrewed components.

Forward deterrence
A French cooperation concept that integrates European partners into consultations, exercises and conventional support for French nuclear deterrence.

Nuclear dyad
The French force structure comprising submarine-launched and air-launched nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Planning Group
The NATO body responsible for political consultation and coordination on nuclear deterrence matters, in which France does not participate.

Nuclear sharing
A NATO arrangement under which European Allies provide infrastructure, delivery aircraft and personnel for the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence mission.

Rafale
A French multirole combat aircraft whose appropriately configured variants can deliver air-launched nuclear weapons.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
An international treaty intended to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and prohibiting non-nuclear-weapon states from acquiring or controlling them.

Two Plus Four Treaty
The final-settlement treaty under which united Germany renounced the manufacture, possession and control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

References

Élysée – Presidency of the French Republic
Visit to the Île Longue Operational Base – Speech by the President of the Republic on France’s Nuclear Deterrence
2 March 2026
https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2026/03/02/deplacement-sur-la-base-operationnelle-de-lile-longue

Élysée – Presidency of the French Republic
Joint Declaration of President Macron and Chancellor Merz
2 March 2026
https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/03/02/joint-declaration-of-president-macron-and-chancellor-merz

Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government
26th Franco-German Council of Ministers and Franco-German Defence and Security Council
10 July 2026
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/26-deutsch-franzoesischer-ministerrat-und-deutsch-franzoesischer-verteidigungs-und-sicherheitsrat-2446612

Élysée – Presidency of the French Republic
NATO Summit in Turkey
8 July 2026
https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2026/07/08/sommet-de-lotan-en-turquie

NATO
NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Forces
20 May 2026
https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/natos-nuclear-deterrence-policy-and-forces

United Nations
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
1 July 1968
https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html

Federal Agency for Civic Education
Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany – Two Plus Four Treaty
12 September 1990
https://www.bpb.de/themen/deutsche-einheit/deutsche-teilung-deutsche-einheit/43784/vertrag-ueber-die-abschliessende-regelung-in-bezug-auf-deutschland-zwei-plus-vier-vertrag/

Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich
Europe’s Changing Nuclear Landscape: French Forward Deterrence
1 July 2026
https://css.ethz.ch/en/center/CSS-news/2026/07/europes-changing-nuclear-landscape-french-forward-deterrence.html

WirtschaftsWoche and Deutsche Presse-Agentur
Germany and France Launch Nuclear Cooperation
16 July 2026
https://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/ministerrat-in-bruehl-deutschland-und-frankreich-starten-atom-kooperation/100240771.html