EMET NEWS PRESS

Situation Assessment I

Reuters published the inventory report on August 4, 2026; The Jerusalem Post republished the agency report. According to the individuals interviewed, the US Army employed large portions of its ATACMS and PrSM stocks against Iranian targets. US Central Command reportedly expended nearly all the land-based missiles available in the Middle East before the war but subsequently received replenishments from US military stocks elsewhere.

The sources neither provided Reuters with the internal inventory records nor disclosed absolute initial and remaining quantities. Pentagon chief spokesperson Sean Parnell stated that the US military retained every capability required to conduct operations ordered by the president and protect American interests. His statement only partially contradicts the reported operational constraint because it provides no inventory figures and does not distinguish between immediately available munitions, strategic reserves, and future production.

According to Reuters, the pressure extends beyond land-based strike systems. A separate anonymous source estimated that the United States had expended slightly less than half of its global Tomahawk inventory since the war began. Reuters could not independently verify this figure. The Center for Strategic and International Studies reported on April 21 that the entire PrSM inventory might have been expended during operations against Iran, while other government officials told CSIS that some missiles remained available.

Situation Assessment II

The Reuters investigation confirms a trend visible since the spring and expands the available information by addressing the combined inventory position of PrSM and ATACMS. Its central finding rests on several government sources whose independence from one another cannot be fully established. The report therefore constitutes a credible warning indicator but does not provide complete verification without access to the underlying records and absolute inventory figures.

The phrase “nearly all” does not mean that the United States has lost its entire long-range strike capability. US forces retain air- and sea-launched weapons, including Tomahawk cruise missiles and precision-guided aerial munitions. The shortage nevertheless changes the operational risk profile: without sufficient ground-launched standoff weapons, commanders must either reduce the target set or rely more heavily on crewed aircraft and limited maritime magazines.

The strategic significance results from several simultaneous demands. The United States continues to support Ukraine, maintains forces in the Indo-Pacific, and requires reserves for potential escalation on the Korean Peninsula. Transferring missiles from other depots preserves operational capacity in the Iran war but may weaken material endurance in other combatant commands.

Operational Significance of ATACMS and PrSM

ATACMS is a ballistic missile launched from HIMARS and MLRS platforms with a maximum range of approximately 300 kilometers. The system is approaching the end of its US service cycle and is being progressively replaced by PrSM. Parts of the American inventory had previously been transferred to Ukraine, placing additional pressure on the available reserve before the Iran war began.

PrSM represents the succeeding generation and exceeds 500 kilometers in range in its fielded baseline configuration. According to Lockheed Martin, the US Army employed the missile in combat for the first time during Operation Epic Fury on March 4, 2026. Because deliveries began only in 2023, the American inventory was limited when the war started. Its operational debut therefore occurred before industrial production had created strategically deep reserves.

Both systems enable attacks against air-defense positions, command facilities, and other time-sensitive targets without exposing crewed aircraft directly to hostile air defenses. Their employment requires HIMARS or MLRS launchers and access to suitable territory within missile range. This dependency limits their transferability to a possible conflict with China but does not remove their value for distributed land operations in the western Pacific.

Industrial Regeneration and the Near-Term Gap

Lockheed Martin and the US Department of Defense agreed on March 25, 2026, to quadruple PrSM production. The company referred to an existing contract award valued at $4.94 billion. According to the company announcement, a potential multiyear contract remains contingent on future congressional authorization.

The production increase cannot replace expended inventories immediately. New production lines require qualified personnel, additional machinery, and resilient supply chains. Even at a higher output rate, ongoing operations, replenishment of US depots, and possible deliveries to allies will compete for the same production.

Comprehensive new procurement of ATACMS is unlikely because the US Army is shifting production to PrSM. This creates a transition risk: the older system is being expended or retired while its successor has not yet reached sufficient inventory depth. The announced fourfold increase describes planned production capacity rather than missiles already available for operations.

Effects on Deterrence and Operational Planning

American deterrence rests partly on the ability to sustain a high-intensity conflict beyond its opening phase. An adversary must expect that the United States can continue striking high-value targets after the first attack wave. Falling missile inventories shorten this calculable endurance horizon.

China and Russia cannot derive a precise American operational threshold from the reported shortfall because remaining quantities and their regional distribution remain classified. They nevertheless gain another indicator of the costs imposed by simultaneous crises. Escalation in a second theater would compel Washington to reprioritize munitions and shift reserves between combatant commands.

The expenditure of Tomahawk, Patriot, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missiles compounds this pressure. Based on publicly available expenditure, production, and inventory information, CSIS estimated that approximately 65 percent of the US Patriot inventory had been expended since February and that the THAAD inventory had fallen by at least 38 percent. Two Reuters sources stated that these estimates matched internal US data, although Reuters did not examine the underlying government records.

Constitutional Framework

The continuing hostilities have generated a dispute in the United States over presidential war powers. According to Reuters, the administration submitted neither a request for a declaration of war nor a specific Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iran. The administration therefore bases the operations on the president’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and its interpretation of the requirements of national defense.

Under 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b), the War Powers Resolution generally requires the termination of military involvement within 60 days when US forces have been introduced into hostilities without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization. The law permits an additional withdrawal period of up to 30 days when unavoidable military necessity requires it. The conditions that activate this statutory clock and the constitutional force of the provision have remained disputed between the executive branch and Congress for decades. The five-month operation therefore increases both the military burden and the domestic pressure over its legal authorization.

Intelligence Assessment

The Reuters report identifies a genuine conflict between sustaining current operations and maintaining global readiness. The central uncertainty concerns the meaning of “available”: government records may classify operational stocks, training munitions, strategic reserves, and contracted future deliveries differently. An inventory report from US Central Command also provides only a partial picture of the Pentagon’s global access to munitions.

The selection of lower-risk standoff weapons explains the high expenditure in operational terms. President Donald Trump’s administration initially avoided greater exposure of crewed combat aircraft to Iranian air defenses. Declining missile stocks narrow this option. Continued intensive strikes would require the release of protected reserves, a reduction in the target rate, or a greater proportion of crewed air operations.

Verifiable early indicators include additional production contracts, supplemental congressional appropriations, and movements of HIMARS or MLRS units. Restrictions on US munitions deliveries to allied states would provide another relevant indicator. Until reliable inventory data are released, the precise depth of the shortage will remain classified; its operational existence is supported by the reported expenditure, previous CSIS findings, and accelerated industrial production.

Glossary

ATACMS
Army Tactical Missile System; a ground-launched ballistic precision missile operated by the US Army with a maximum range of approximately 300 kilometers.

PrSM
Precision Strike Missile; the successor to ATACMS, offering greater range and further development for additional target categories.

HIMARS
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System; a wheeled multiple-launch rocket system capable of firing guided rockets, ATACMS, and PrSM.

MLRS
Multiple Launch Rocket System; a tracked multiple-launch rocket system operated by the US Army and allied forces.

THAAD
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense; an American system designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside and outside the atmosphere.

US Central Command
The American regional combatant command responsible for the Middle East and adjacent 

operational areas.

War Powers Resolution
A 1973 US federal law governing congressional participation in prolonged military deployments.

Persons Register

Donald Trump
President of the United States and constitutional Commander in Chief during the Iran war.

Sean Parnell
Chief Pentagon spokesperson; stated to Reuters that the US military continued to possess the capabilities required for its assigned missions.

References

Reuters
US has used ‘virtually all’ of its long-range precision missiles during Iran war, sources say
August 4, 2026
reuters.com/world/us-has-used-virtually-all-its-long-range-precision-missiles-during-iran-war-2026-08-04

The Jerusalem Post
Low stockpiles of US long-range precision missile raise concerns
August 4, 2026
jpost.com/international/article-904564

Center for Strategic and International Studies
Last Rounds? Status of Key Munitions at the Iran War Ceasefire
April 21, 2026
csis.org/analysis/last-rounds-status-key-munitions-iran-war-ceasefire

Center for Strategic and International Studies
Renewed Iran War Would Test Diminished Interceptor Inventories
July 27, 2026
csis.org/analysis/renewed-iran-war-would-test-diminished-interceptor-inventories

Lockheed Martin
Lockheed Martin Answers the Nation’s Call and Quadruples Precision Strike Missile Production
March 25, 2026
news.lockheedmartin.com/2026-03-25-Lockheed-Martin-Answers-the-Nations-Call-and-Quadruples-Precision-Strike-Missile-Production

US House of Representatives, Office of the Law Revision Counsel
50 U.S.C. § 1544 – Congressional action
Accessed August 4, 2026
uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title50-section1544