EMET NEWS PRESS

Situation Assessment

Schularick argues that Germany continues to allocate a substantial share of its projected defence expenditure through 2030 to main battle tanks, frigates and combat aircraft. Additional expenditure supports barracks and personnel growth. Given Germany’s limited mobilisation potential, the Bundeswehr should automate suitable tasks and transfer selected missions to unmanned systems.

His criticism also targets the defence-industrial base. Schularick advocates financing production capacity instead of purchasing only limited quantities of individual systems. Manufacturers must be able to increase the output of air-defence missiles and precision-guided munitions during a crisis. The same requirement applies to drones and spare parts.

This demand addresses an operational bottleneck. Military endurance depends on more than the inventories available at the start of a conflict. Production equipment and skilled personnel must already be available. Critical suppliers and precursor materials must also remain accessible. A production system designed for small peacetime orders cannot rapidly compensate for wartime consumption and attrition.

Public budget documents and parliamentary procurement submissions identify numerous major acquisition programmes. They do not provide a complete functional breakdown covering platforms, digitalisation and research. Expenditure on unmanned systems and technical integration is also difficult to isolate. The actual allocation of resources can therefore be assessed only in part from public information.

Operational Assessment

The war in Ukraine has confirmed the tactical value of unmanned systems. Drones provide forward reconnaissance and identify targets. They correct artillery fire and support battle-damage assessment. Armed variants can engage individual vehicles or positions. Their use shortens the sensor-to-effector chain and increases battlefield transparency.

These capabilities do not remove the requirement for heavy land forces. Drones can observe and strike a defensive position, yet they cannot occupy terrain or hold a defensive sector. They also cannot transport infantry under armour through mined ground or contested approaches. Main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles remain necessary. Engineers, artillery and ground-based air defence provide the supporting functions.

The main battle tank delivers protected mobility, direct firepower and shock effect. Its vulnerability rises sharply when deployed without forward reconnaissance or infantry protection. Engineer support and electronic countermeasures are equally important. 

Organic drones must monitor routes and assembly areas. Electronic warfare assets must disrupt hostile control links. Short-range air defence and active protection systems must defeat incoming threats. Concealment, deception and rapid repair remain essential to the survival of mechanised forces.

The same principle applies to air and maritime forces. The F-35 provides air-strike capability and sensor fusion. It also supports passive reconnaissance, target allocation and tactical data distribution. Germany requires the aircraft for its role in NATO nuclear sharing.

Frigates provide task-group air defence and anti-submarine warfare. They also conduct escort operations, sea control and command functions. Unmanned supporting systems can extend reconnaissance or carry additional effectors. They may also assume missions with an elevated risk to personnel. Their present capability set does not cover the full operational spectrum of crewed core platforms.

Cost and Force Comparison

A comparison between the procurement price of a Leopard 2A8 and a larger number of drones does not establish military interchangeability. The systems perform different missions and have different operational profiles. Their expected attrition also differs substantially.

A main battle tank contract may include training and spare parts. Special tools, documentation and technical support may form part of the same package. Drone operations require sensors, ground-control stations and protected data links. Personnel, software support and replacement aircraft generate additional costs. Intensive electronic warfare can produce high disruption rates and substantial platform losses.

Force planning must therefore assess the assigned mission, the threat environment and the required availability. Endurance and logistical demand are equally relevant. Unit price alone cannot determine the relative military value of systems designed for different tasks.

Readiness Horizon 2029

The Federal Ministry of Defence is directing force development towards sufficient readiness for national and collective defence by 2029. This planning horizon reflects the assessment that Russia could acquire the capability to conduct a limited or wider attack against NATO territory before the end of the decade.

The year 2029 is not a formal NATO deadline confined to the Baltic flank. It is a German readiness objective within wider Alliance force planning. Germany’s Panzerbrigade 45 in Lithuania is scheduled to reach full operational capability in 2027. Germany must also provide additional forces for reinforcement and ensure their movement into theatre. 

Sustainment and command arrangements must be operational before deployment.

Long-term development programmes cannot close every short-term capability gap. Germany must therefore acquire available air-defence systems and ammunition. Protected combat vehicles and logistical capacity are also required within the current planning period.

Commercially available drones, sensors and software can enter service before 2029. Delays arise primarily from procurement procedures and military certification. Incompatible interfaces and inadequately protected data links create further obstacles. Retrofitting digital capabilities after platform delivery increases costs and threatens the timely readiness of complete formations.

Command and Connectivity

The Defence Ministry has cited approximately EUR 20 billion for military digitalisation. It has also referred to several billion euros for unmanned effectors. A further EUR 35 billion is planned for military space capabilities through 2030. These figures relate to separate programmes and funding periods. They do not constitute an internal breakdown of the original EUR 100 billion special fund.

The programmes confirm that Germany is investing in digital and unmanned capabilities alongside conventional platforms. The aggregate figures provide no measure of tactical utility. Spending on administrative systems and data centres does not automatically produce a deployable command network. Sensor information must reach the assigned unit securely and within the required engagement window.

A mechanised formation can exploit drone reconnaissance only when its radios and command systems are compatible. Artillery and air support require validated target data over protected transmission routes. Poor interoperability extends the sensor-to-effector chain and allows mobile targets to leave the engagement area.

The Bundeswehr established the Cyber and Information Domain Service as a separate military organisational area in 2017. It was later elevated to service status. Its responsibilities include operating and protecting military information systems. It also provides reconnaissance and effects within the information domain. The organisational structure does not demonstrate that the Army, Air Force and Navy possess seamless technical connectivity. The same reservation applies to military space components.

Research, Development and the Industrial Base

Schularick’s criticism of German military research and development expenditure identifies a structural risk. International spending ratios remain difficult to compare because states account for development, testing and procurement under different budget rules.

Europe retains capable manufacturers and research institutions across several military technology sectors. The more significant deficits concern industrial scaling and short software cycles. Dependence on advanced semiconductors and military cloud infrastructure creates additional exposure. Delays in transferring mature technology into operational service remain a recurring weakness.

Export controls or supply interruptions could impair readiness during a crisis. Restricted access to software updates would create a similar risk. Higher research expenditure will generate military value only when successful projects move rapidly into testing and serial production. Long transitions between development and fielding increase the probability of technical obsolescence before operational deployment.

Intelligence Assessment

The most likely capability risk through 2029 is the delivery of new platforms without the support required to employ complete formations. Insufficient ammunition stocks and limited spare-part availability could restrict sustained operations. Weak data connectivity or inadequate industrial replenishment would produce the same effect. Confidence in this assessment is high.

Schularick’s criticism would gain further support if major platform programmes continue to absorb most available resources while drones and command networks remain confined to small production runs. Persistent delays between troop trials and serial procurement would indicate that the innovation deficit remains unresolved. Failure to contract reserve production capacity would reinforce that assessment.

The Defence Ministry’s position would gain support if new platforms enter complete formations alongside operational drones and protected command links. Adequate ammunition holdings and contracted production capacity would provide additional evidence. Exercises would need to demonstrate that reconnaissance data can reach artillery and combat vehicles without manual transfer. The same test applies to air defence and air support.

Publicly observable indicators include the operational status of Panzerbrigade 45 and the number of unmanned systems introduced into regular service. The interval between troop trials and serial contracts provides a further measure. Annual output of air-defence missiles and precision-guided munitions will indicate industrial capacity. Documented interoperability during national and NATO exercises will show whether higher expenditure is producing deployable combat power.

Glossary

CIR: Cyber and Information Domain Service of the Bundeswehr.

R&D: Research and development.

Interoperability: The ability of different forces and systems to exchange information and operate together without additional technical conversion.

Sensor-to-effector chain: The sequence from detecting and identifying a target through command approval to engagement and subsequent battle-damage assessment.

Persons Register

Moritz Schularick: President of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Boris Pistorius: Federal Minister of Defence of Germany.

References

Süddeutsche Zeitung — “The EUR 700 Billion Programme Risks Failing” — 9 August 2026.
sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/bundeswehr-pistorius-ruestungsindustrie-sondervermoegen-moritz-schularick-kritik-li.3527397

Tagesschau — “IfW President Accuses Pistorius of Misallocating Defence Investment” — 10 August 2026.
tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/kritik-schularick-pistorius-waffen-bundeswehr-100.html

Handelsblatt — “Drones Instead of Tanks: Is Germany Rearming the Wrong Way?” — 10 August 2026.
handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/drohnen-statt-panzer-ruestet-deutschland-falsch-auf-kritik-an-pistorius/100246091.html

Federal Ministry of Defence — “A Year Focused on Defence Readiness” — 30 April 2026.
bmvg.de/de/presse/weichenstellung-aufwuchs-6097806

Federal Ministry of Defence — “Space Congress: Security and Defence Capability in Orbit” — 25 September 2025.
bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/weltraumkongress-verteidigungsminister-sicherheit-5996640

German Bundestag — “Boris Pistorius: We Must Be Ready for War by 2029” — 5 June 2024.
bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2024/kw23-de-regierungsbefragung-1002264

Bundeswehr — “The Cyber and Information Domain Service” — Organisational overview, accessed 11 August 2026.

bundeswehr.de/en/organization/the-cyber-and-information-domain-service