EMET NEWS PRESS

Operational Assessment

A Russian attack on the Baltic states would not abolish Swiss or Austrian neutrality. It would, however, substantially alter its practical meaning.

Neutrality limits military participation. It does not shield a state from the effects of a European war on air traffic, transport corridors, energy supply, communications networks, financial infrastructure, defence production, supply chains or internal security.

Switzerland and Austria could remain outside direct combat operations. They could not remain outside the strategic environment of a NATO–Russia war.

Austria would be more tightly bound because of its EU membership. Switzerland would retain greater scope to deny militarily relevant support. That autonomy would carry consequences for procurement, industrial cooperation, interoperability and European confidence.

The conflict would therefore not determine whether neutrality survives as a legal status. It would determine whether neutrality remains a viable security model under wartime pressure.

The Baltic Theatre

An attack on Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania would not be a local border conflict. It would trigger collective-defence planning across NATO and place the European Union under its mutual-assistance obligation.

The first conventional operations would concentrate on the Baltic Sea region, the Baltic states, Poland, Finland, Kaliningrad, Belarus and the air and maritime routes of north-eastern Europe.

Military endurance would not depend solely on forces deployed in theatre. NATO would need to expand air defence, strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling, ammunition supply, medical support, electronic warfare, command networks, satellite-enabled intelligence and reinforcement movements simultaneously.

Forward Land Forces on the eastern flank could complicate a rapid Russian advance. They would not replace large-scale reinforcement from Western Europe and North America.

This would make almost every capable European transport, energy, data and defence-industrial asset strategically relevant. Switzerland and Austria would remain outside the initial kinetic theatre. Their railway networks, road corridors, airports, logistics areas, data centres, energy facilities and industrial enterprises would nevertheless form part of the wider European support environment.

Conflict Phase I: Hybrid Preparatory Pressure

Before an overt attack, hybrid operations would be likely. Russia could seek to slow decision-making, undermine confidence in Western security guarantees and intensify existing social and political divisions.

The operational spectrum would include cyber attacks, sabotage preparation, influence operations, disinformation, espionage against defence and technology firms, disruption of critical infrastructure and economic coercion.

In Switzerland, relevant target areas would include financial-market infrastructure, data centres, international organisations, dual-use research, energy supply, defence suppliers and sensitive data holdings.

Direct democracy broadens the political attack surface. Neutrality, sanctions, defence-industrial cooperation, air defence and NATO interoperability can be turned into domestic disputes through referendums, initiatives and coordinated campaigns.

In Austria, Vienna’s role as a location for international organisations, transport and energy hubs, rail and road routes towards south-eastern Europe, diplomatic infrastructure and economic as well as intelligence connections to Eastern and South-Eastern Europe would create particular exposure.

Russia would not treat neutrality as a passive legal status. Neutrality would be an operational lever.

Any deeper cooperation with NATO, the EU or Western defence-industrial structures could be portrayed as a loss of national sovereignty. The intended effect would be to increase the political cost of security cooperation and push governments towards a more restrictive interpretation of their available options.

In Switzerland, such narratives could find resonance primarily in sovereignty-oriented, EU-sceptical and anti-integration political environments.

In Austria, they could gain traction in neutrality-oriented, EU-critical and Russia-friendly networks. The relevant issue would not be the formal adoption of Russian positions. The relevant issue would be the amplification of existing disputes over sanctions, transit, military mobility, defence cooperation and European solidarity.

These narratives would have the operational purpose of constraining political decision-making, delaying responses and raising the domestic cost of European security cooperation.

Conflict Phase II: Open Hostilities

Once open fighting begins, neutrality would shift from a political principle to a sequence of concrete operational decisions.

Relevant issues would include military air and ground transit, the use of railways, roads, airports and logistics hubs, repair and maintenance of military systems, spare parts, ammunition, military communications, recognised operational pictures, medical evacuation and the protection of critical infrastructure directly relevant to reinforcement forces.

Under classical neutrality law, neutral territory may not be used for military operations, troop movements or supply transports by a conflict party. This generally applies to neutral airspace as well. Humanitarian and medical exceptions must be assessed separately.

Switzerland: Re-export Precedent and Procurement Consequences

Switzerland would not be obliged to support NATO operations. It could refuse military transit, the use of its airspace, maintenance services, supply movements and the transfer of war-relevant goods.

The 2022 and 2023 precedent remains central to the assessment. Bern denied third states permission to transfer Swiss-manufactured military materiel to Ukraine. Requests from Germany, Denmark and Spain were among those affected.

That policy was not merely a neutrality signal. It produced tangible procurement consequences.

The Federal Council stated in 2025 that the re-export restrictions had contributed to Switzerland no longer being regarded consistently as a reliable partner in Europe. States and firms increasingly excluded Switzerland from procurement projects and supply chains.

For NATO-adjacent procurement planning, the conclusion is clear: Swiss ammunition, components and subsystems can only be reliably included in European supply chains where their transfer in crisis conditions has been legally clarified in advance.

Where a separate Swiss national approval remains necessary, an availability risk emerges. Procurement authorities respond through sourcing substitution: shifting contracts, component choices and ammunition planning towards suppliers from states whose re-export conditions are predictable in a collective-defence contingency.

The parliamentary decision of December 2025 to ease export and re-export regulations for 25 Western states changes this context materially. Its practical implications will depend on entry into force, implementing provisions and any Federal Council reservations. The earlier policy can therefore no longer be treated as an unchanged baseline for a Baltic contingency.

The strategic damage from 2022 and 2023 remains relevant. European partners have learned that Swiss defence goods can be legally blocked during a European war. That experience continues to shape procurement decisions.

Switzerland would therefore need to decide before a crisis whether its neutrality is compatible with reliable European defence-industrial cooperation. Without pre-agreed release mechanisms, it would face a choice between neutrality doctrine and industrial isolation in the event of war.

Austria: Treaty Obligation under a Neutrality Reservation

Austria would be more tightly bound in legal terms.

Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union requires the other member states to provide aid and assistance by all means in their power when an EU member state is the victim of armed aggression. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are EU member states.

The Treaty simultaneously preserves the specific character of the security and defence policy of neutral member states. This reservation gives Austria room to determine the form and scope of its assistance. It does not provide a politically cost-free exit from the assistance obligation.

Vienna could not credibly state that it would provide no support at all. Austria would have to render assistance while explaining to European partners, its domestic public and Russia which forms of support remain compatible with neutrality and which are excluded.

Diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, medical, technical and civilian assistance would be comparatively manageable in legal and political terms.

More difficult issues would include military transit, militarily usable infrastructure, maintenance services, protected communications, air-defence data, ammunition movements and logistics supporting NATO reinforcement.

The conflict would not primarily be an abstract constitutional question. It would be operational.

The longer the war continued, the harder it would become to separate civilian infrastructure, military mobility and European defence preparation.

Austria’s geographical position would intensify this pressure. The country lies between Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and South-Eastern Europe. Railway routes, road corridors, energy links, airports and logistics areas would carry substantial strategic value in a prolonged war.

The 1955 Neutrality Act prohibits Austria from joining military alliances and hosting foreign military bases. It does not support a simple interpretation under which Vienna could fully abstain from assistance obligations within the European Union.

Conflict Phase III: Frozen Front and Persistent Hybrid Pressure

A frozen front would create the most demanding long-term environment for neutrality in both states.

Immediate decisions under conventional escalation could become less urgent. Sabotage, espionage, cyber operations, economic coercion and political influence activity would continue.

Russian actors could combine three narratives.

First: any cooperation with NATO or the EU makes neutral states de facto parties to the conflict.

Second: sanctions, transit restrictions and European security cooperation impose greater economic costs domestically than on Russia.

Third: neutrality is only credible if it excludes all operational connectivity with Western security structures.

In Switzerland, this would affect the central question of whether neutrality means primarily military non-participation or broad foreign-policy distance from Europe and NATO.

A restrictive interpretation could constrain defence cooperation, procurement, air defence and information exchange. A cooperation-oriented interpretation would trigger domestic resistance.

In Austria, the debate would focus on the scope of the EU mutual-assistance obligation, military mobility, infrastructure, the Neutrality Act and the role of the Bundesheer.

Political pressure would be greater than in Switzerland. Austria cannot define its neutrality without regard to its treaty obligations within the European Union.

The Operational Asymmetry

Switzerland retains greater political autonomy. It is neither an EU nor a NATO member and can interpret its neutrality more extensively through national practice.

That autonomy simultaneously increases the risk of security and industrial isolation.

Austria has less political distance. EU membership, the mutual-assistance clause, transit geography and integration into European infrastructure limit Vienna’s ability to remain entirely outside a European response.

Switzerland can deny militarily relevant support more extensively. The costs would arise in procurement, industrial cooperation, interoperability and European confidence.

Austria can preserve neutrality formally. The EU treaty obligation would, however, force Vienna more rapidly into decisions on infrastructure, transit, logistics and assistance whose military utility for NATO states could not be fully disregarded.

Outlook to 2030

An immediate NATO accession by Switzerland or Austria would remain unlikely even after a Russian attack on the Baltic states.

In Switzerland, direct democracy, the tradition of neutrality and the preference for autonomous security decisions would make a rapid alliance accession difficult.

The more likely trajectory would be armed, cooperation-capable neutrality. Priorities would include ground-based air defence, ammunition reserves, protected communications, cyber defence, mobilisation, defence-industrial cooperation and pre-arranged crisis mechanisms.

In Austria, the constitutional and political threshold for NATO accession would also remain high.

The more likely path would be a denser form of EU-bound neutrality. Austria would expand military mobility, protection of critical infrastructure, cyber defence, medical support, logistics, European procurement projects and the practical implementation of the EU mutual-assistance obligation.

A short conflict would leave the formal neutrality of both states intact.

A prolonged war involving attacks on Central European infrastructure would sharply limit its practical scope.

Overall Assessment

A Russian attack on the Baltic states would not end Swiss or Austrian neutrality. It would reduce it to limited military abstention.

Switzerland would need to decide whether it defines neutrality primarily through the refusal of militarily relevant support or whether it secures its defence capability, industrial integration and procurement reliability through pre-arranged cooperation.

Austria would need to determine how it fulfils a binding European assistance obligation without fully hollowing out neutrality as a constitutional and political framework.

Neutrality would remain intact as a legal status. It would not create strategic distance from the European war environment.

References

EUR-Lex
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008M042

Republic of Austria — Legal Information System
www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1955_211/ERV_1955_211.pdf

Swiss Federal Council — Re-export of War Materiel, 10 March 2023
www.admin.ch/en/nsb?id=93641

Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs — Neutrality Report, 26 October 2022
www.eda.admin.ch/en/neutrality

International Committee of the Red Cross — Neutrality and the Law of Armed Conflict www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/en/assets/files/other/law8_final.pdf

North Atlantic Treaty Organization — Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank
www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/strengthening-natos-eastern-flank