EMET NEWS PRESS

The European security architecture stands at a strategic inflection point in fiscal year 2026. The United States National Defense Strategy under the concept of Flexible Realism prioritises Homeland Defense and the containment of China in the Indo-Pacific. Washington signals a reduction of its conventional presence in Europe to a minimum and transfers primary responsibility for continental defence to NATO partners.

The NATO Military Committee reformed the Defence Planning Process in May 2026, shifting focus to high readiness of large formations on the Eastern Flank, integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence, and significantly shortened reaction times. US nuclear extended deterrence remains an uncertainty factor, elevating the strategic relevance of French and British nuclear contributions.The analytical driver behind US behaviour is a fundamental reassessment of threat priorities and resource allocation. China is assessed as the systemic long-term peer competitor with superior industrial scale, technological momentum, and the capacity to dominate the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s sophisticated A2/AD strategy denies access to key maritime spaces in the South and East China Seas. Core elements include the DF-21D “carrier killer” ballistic anti-ship missile (≈1,500 km), the DF-26 (up to 4,000 km, dual-capable, threatening Guam), supersonic YJ-12/YJ-18/YJ-100 cruise missiles, layered integrated air defence (HQ-9 family), J-20 stealth fighters, and dense sensor networks combining OTH radars, satellites, and UAVs, supported by electronic warfare, ASAT, and cyber capabilities. 

The US therefore concentrates resources on maritime domain awareness, A2/AD penetration (hypersonic weapons, distributed maritime operations), and nuclear modernisation. AUKUS forms the cornerstone: transfer of Virginia-class nuclear submarines to Australia, joint hypersonic weapon development, AI-enabled undersea surveillance, and integrated logistics to establish persistent high-mobility subsurface and surface presence capable of penetrating Chinese A2/AD zones.This strategic shift is not yet a completed fact but a combination of political signalling, gradual capability reallocation, and strategic communication. Actual reductions in US conventional forces in Europe remain limited and reversible. Nuclear extended deterrence stays largely intact.The threat environment for Europe is multidimensional. 

Russia remains the primary adversary, capable of hybrid escalation, limited conventional thrusts, and positional attrition warfare. A NATO Article 5 scenario at the Suwałki Corridor or in the Baltic States constitutes the central risk. Simultaneous conflict scenarios, in which Russia exploits a Taiwan or South China Sea crisis to tie down NATO resources, increase complexity. Hybrid instruments — disinformation, sabotage of critical infrastructure, cyber attacks, and weaponised migration — complement conventional threats.Europe must close critical gaps in strategic reconnaissance, strategic lift, and Command and Control independently. Discussion of a European Security Council faces strong sovereignty reservations from France, Poland, and Türkiye. A more realistic interim format is an E5-E6 leadership group (Germany, France, Poland, UK, Italy plus rotation) to be gradually institutionalised. For smaller member states this marks the end of ambitious full-spectrum national armies. Specialisation and multilateral task-sharing are unavoidable. 

The process will require five to eight years to achieve credible full-spectrum defence capability against high-intensity symmetric threats. Lessons from Ukraine must be internalised: mass employment of low-cost drones, electronic warfare, deep strikes, and the superiority of mass combined with attrition resistance over pure high-technology solutions.Eastern European states act as frontrunners. Poland reached 4.48 % of GDP in defence spending in 2025, Lithuania 4.0 %, and Latvia 3.73 %, with emphasis on mobility, border fortification, and munitions stockpiling. Western Europe lags. The industrial bottleneck remains the central risk. Rheinmetall targets 1–1.5 million 155 mm rounds annually by 2027. Nammo, BAE Systems, and KNDS are scaling production, yet shortages in energetics, skilled labour, nitrocellulose, and raw materials persist. Delivery times for air defence systems and artillery continue at 24–48 months. Material attrition from sustained deterrence rotations on the Eastern Flank impedes reserve build-up. 

NATO’s 3.5 % core defence spending target by 2035 requires profound budgetary reform in Western Europe. Debt brakes, election cycles, and domestic resistance act as significant brakes.Technical incompatibilities in data links, communications, and the cyber domain constitute the primary operational risk. Legally binding harmonisation of national procurement cycles from the concept phase is essential. Planning documents expand the approach to Total Defence, integrating civilian critical infrastructure, cyber resilience, industrial base (including semiconductors and metal processing), and societal resilience. This marks the paradigm shift from crisis prevention to preparation for high-intensity attrition warfare. European planning must account for non-kinetic risks: a Taiwan crisis would severely disrupt supply chains for semiconductors, rare earths, and energetics.

This US realignment generates significant disadvantages for strategic capabilities on both sides. The United States gains resources for the China focus but loses global power projection flexibility in simultaneous conflicts. Russia could exploit an Indo-Pacific crisis to advance on the Eastern Flank while US reinforcements arrive delayed or reduced. This erodes extended deterrence credibility. The US becomes dependent on European performance, which still shows critical shortfalls in munitions, integrated air defence, and strategic mobility. Failure of Europe would create follow-on costs through instability, refugee flows, or renewed interventions. Alliance coherence declines. The Sino-Russian tandem is strengthened as Russia binds European resources while China operates in the Pacific.Europe gains ownership but remains in a five-to-eight-year vulnerability window. Capability gaps and delayed readiness increase operational risks on the Eastern Flank, particularly in the Baltics and at the Suwałki Corridor. Reduced US support in aircraft, bombers, and submarines extends reaction times. Russia maintains advantages in massed artillery, drones, and electronic warfare and optimises for positional attrition with high loss tolerance. Russian reconstitution enables limited offensive actions against NATO territory. Industrial and financial bottlenecks combined with political fragmentation slow consolidation. 

Russia exploits this phase through hybrid operations, disinformation, and division. The risk of limited Russian successes or forced compromises rises in the coming years.The year 2026 marks Europe’s transition toward genuine strategic autonomy. The strategic direction is correct; implementation speed remains insufficient. Europe possesses the resources and technological potential. What is lacking is velocity, political willingness for partial sovereignty transfer, and consistent prioritisation. The Baltic states and Poland demonstrate feasibility through high spending and rapid adaptation. Western European nations must now deliver. Otherwise, the Alliance risks a persistent capability gap until 2030 that Russia can exploit. Successful transformation requires long-term offtake contracts for munitions, massive investment in energetics and skilled labour, expansion of drone and loitering munition capabilities, and decentralised command. Only then will a credible deterrent against Russian mass and attrition strategy emerge.

Glossary

Flexible Realism
US strategic doctrine that concentrates resource priorities on the Indo-Pacific and Homeland Defense.

NDPP

NATO Defence Planning Process – the Alliance’s central capability and operational planning instrument.

Command and Control
Command-and-control systems and leadership information systems for directing military operations.

E5-E6 Structure
Informal leadership format of the five/six militarily and politically most influential European states.

Full-Spectrum National Army
National armed forces that independently cover the entire spectrum of military capabilities.

Energetics
Explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnic components for munitions.Total Defence
Comprehensive national and societal approach to resilience and defence.

Deep Strikes
Operations with long-range effectors against enemy command, logistics, and reserves.

Attrition Resistance
Ability to sustain high personnel and material losses over extended periods. 

References:

NATO Secretary General Annual Report 2025

US Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy 2026

European Defence Agency, Defence Industry Reports 2025.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2026

Polish and Lithuanian Ministries of Defence, Budget Reports 2025

Rheinmetall AG, Production Capacity Updates 2025-2026

EU Commission, Defence Readiness Documents 2025

RAND Corporation & Atlantic Council, European Deterrence Studies 2025

SIPRI, Trends in World Military Expenditure 2025