Israel’s Covert Network in Iran: What Is Known About Mossad Operations Behind “Rising Lion”
6. Juni 2026
Richard Krauss
The Essentials in 30 Seconds
Israel’s operation “Rising Lion” began on 13 June 2025 and, according to international reporting, was not merely an air campaign but a combined intelligence, sabotage, and air operation.
Multiple reports refer to drones, precision weapons, and local agent networks pre-positioned inside Iran, which struck Iranian air-defence and missile infrastructure before or in parallel with Israeli airstrikes.
The description of a “secret army” is journalistically sharpened; analytically, the more precise term is a Mossad-led agent and sabotage network with operational effect inside Iranian territory.
The basic operational pattern is sufficiently supported. Details regarding the number, origin, training, and remaining operational capability of the individuals involved remain publicly only partly verifiable.
Why Was “Rising Lion” More Than an Air Operation?
Israel’s operation “Rising Lion” began on 13 June 2025 as a coordinated strike against targets connected to Iran’s nuclear programme, missile forces, and air-defence system. Publicly visible were primarily the airstrikes conducted by the Israeli Air Force. According to international reporting, however, the decisive operational element was the preparatory and accompanying activity of Israel’s foreign intelligence service, Mossad.
Reuters, AP, ProPublica, Ynet, and CSIS describe a converging pattern: pre-positioned equipment, local operatives, drone strikes, sabotage against air-defence systems, and subsequent airstrikes. Reuters reported on 13 June 2025, citing Israeli security sources, that Mossad elements had used explosive drones and precision-guided systems inside Iran against missile and air-defence targets. Full independent verification was not publicly available.
This shifted the operational centre of gravity. The effect of Israel’s air campaign was not determined by range, munitions, and aerial refuelling alone. What appears to have been decisive was the ability to disrupt Iranian defensive structures before the first visible main strike.
What Is Known About the Network Inside Iran?
The Jüdische Allgemeine refers to a Ynet report according to which Mossad did not primarily deploy Israeli special forces inside Iran, but relied on local and non-Israeli networks built up over several years. Ynet reports that Iranian civilians were recruited, trained, and later activated inside Iran. They reportedly assembled components for weapons and drones, received target instructions, and carried out tasks against military targets during the opening phase of the operation.
ProPublica reaches a similar basic assessment in an independent investigation. The report relies on current and former Israeli intelligence officials and describes Mossad as having recruited individuals from Iran and neighbouring states to attack Iranian air-defence positions and ballistic missile launchers during the opening phase. ProPublica cites approximately 70 commandos, organised in teams. This figure has not been publicly independently confirmed.
The term “secret army” therefore describes effect rather than structure. An army has an open force structure, institutional command chains, uniforms, and formal military affiliation. What the sources describe is more accurately a covertly directed agent and sabotage network with paramilitary capability. This refers to state action by Israel through its foreign intelligence service, not to Jewish life worldwide.
Which Targets Were Central?
The known reports identify three target categories: Iranian air defence, ballistic missile infrastructure, and command structures. Operationally, this selection follows a clear logic. Air defence had to be weakened to give Israeli aircraft greater freedom of movement. Missile infrastructure had to be struck to reduce Iran’s immediate retaliatory capability. Command and communications nodes had to be disrupted to slow the reaction time and coordination of the Iranian security apparatus.
AP described the operation as a combination of airstrikes, espionage, AI-supported target selection, and armed drones smuggled into Iran. The operational purpose was therefore to neutralise or degrade Iranian air-defence and missile capabilities at an early stage.
CSIS classified “Rising Lion” as an example of integrated warfare: covert operations, drones, airstrikes, and data-based targeting did not operate sequentially, but as a single attack system. For military assessment, this point is central. Mossad apparently did not operate separately alongside the air force, but as part of a prepared joint intelligence-strike architecture.
Why Was the Opening Phase Decisive?
The first hours of an air operation determine whether an adversary can employ sensors, interceptors, launchers, and command posts in an organised manner. If radar sites, air-defence batteries, missile launchers, or communications nodes are struck early, a state does not only lose hardware. It loses reaction speed.
This appears to have been the function of the covert Mossad component. It was not designed to destroy Iranian defences completely, but to break their initial response. This allowed the Israeli Air Force to operate inside an already disrupted defensive environment.
CSIS assesses this development as an indicator of modern theatre entry operations. Entry into hostile airspace is no longer achieved through classical air superiority alone, but through the combination of advance reconnaissance, drones, cyber and deception measures, special operations, and precision airstrikes.
What Remains Publicly Unconfirmed?
The exact number of individuals involved remains unconfirmed. Their nationalities, recruitment pathways, duration of training, specific escape or exfiltration routes, and the question of whether operational networks remained active in Iran after the operation are also unclear.
The information provided by Israeli sources must be assessed as part of strategic communication. This does not reduce its informational value per se, but it requires independent cross-checking. Israel has an interest in demonstrating to the Iranian regime the depth of its own vulnerability. Iranian authorities, conversely, have an interest in downplaying the extent of foreign penetration or externally framing internal security failures.
A serious assessment must therefore distinguish between the publicly supported basic pattern and details that remain independently unconfirmed. The existence of a covert Israeli operational component inside Iran is a defensible assessment. A precise reconstruction of all networks involved is not.
What Is the Strategic Significance?
The operation exposes a structural weakness of authoritarian security systems: repression, surveillance, and isolation do not automatically prevent operational penetration. Highly centralised systems can be vulnerable when local networks, technical components, and external targeting are brought together over an extended period.
For Iran’s security architecture, the episode is serious. If a foreign intelligence service can pre-position weapons components on national territory, activate local operatives, and strike military targets in synchronisation with airstrikes, the issue is not merely isolated protection gaps. It concerns counterintelligence, border and transport control, physical protection of military infrastructure, and the trust architecture inside the regime.
For Israel, the operational lesson is different. Strategic reach is not generated solely by aircraft, munitions, and aerial refuelling. It also arises from long-prepared intelligence access, covert logistics, local source handling, and the ability to combine these elements with kinetic force at the decisive moment.
What Does This Mean Militarily?
Militarily, “Rising Lion” is an example of integrated pre-war positioning. The decisive part of an operation does not begin with the first airstrike, but months or years earlier: recruitment, reconnaissance, smuggling, storage, concealment, target validation, and communications security.
The visible air campaign is only the final phase. Before it lies the invisible preparation. If that preparation succeeds, a state can overload an adversary’s air defence, missile forces, and command posts during the first hours. The result is not complete collapse, but a temporary operational opening.
For Western armed forces, the case is relevant. It confirms the growing importance of HUMINT, OSINT, cyber, UAS, special operations, and classical air power as an integrated system. Anyone who looks only at the airstrikes misses the core. The actual capability lies in synchronisation.
Overall Assessment
The global body of evidence suggests that Israel had access to a covertly activatable network inside Iran that produced operational effect during “Rising Lion”. The likely focus was the degradation of Iranian air defence, the disruption of ballistic missile capabilities, and the support of precision airstrikes.
The source base is strong enough to state that the operation was not conducted from the air alone. It is not strong enough to establish all details regarding the number, structure, and continued existence of the network. The term “secret army” should therefore be understood only as a journalistic shorthand. Analytically, the more precise term is: Mossad’s covert agent and sabotage network inside Iran.
The strategic relevance does not lie in intelligence drama. It lies in the operational connection between local penetration, technical sabotage, and air power. The attack begins inside the adversary’s system long before it becomes visible from the outside.
References
Jüdische Allgemeine
Report on Ynet findings concerning Mossad’s alleged agent network inside Iran and its role in “Rising Lion”.
www.juedische-allgemeine.de/israel/israels-geheime-armee-im-iran/
Ynet / Ron Ben-Yishai
Report on Iranian civilians, Mossad training, and the operational involvement of local networks inside Iran.
www.ynetnews.com/article/b1n4aytemg
Reuters
Report from 13 June 2025 on Israeli claims regarding covert Mossad operations, drones, and precision weapons inside Iran.
www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-used-long-planned-subterfuge-attack-iranian-nuclear-targets-israeli-2025-06-13/
ProPublica
Investigation into Iranian and regional operatives allegedly recruited by Mossad, including attacks on air-defence systems and missile launchers.
www.propublica.org/article/israel-iran-war-mossad-iranian-recruits
Associated Press
Assessment of the operation as an interaction between airstrikes, espionage, drones, and data-based target selection.
apnews.com/article/mossad-iran-israel-weapons-missiles-a504ee31c70857c8d86a0d066997e344
CSIS
Military analysis of “Rising Lion” as an example of integrated modern warfare involving drones, special operations, and air power.
www.csis.org/analysis/ungentlemanly-robots-israels-operation-rising-lion-and-new-way-war
ABC Australia
Analysis of Mossad’s role before and during operation “Rising Lion”.
www.abc.net.au/news/2025-06-27/operation-rising-lion-israel-iran/105441110