EMET NEWS PRESS

The German federal government is currently working on a reform of the country’s internal security architecture. The aim is to grant the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and other security authorities extended operational capabilities in order to respond more effectively to hybrid threats. This is not a fundamental restructuring of the entire system or a blanket tightening of surveillance, but a targeted security-architectural shift: the authorities are to receive additional capabilities in precisely defined areas, enabling them to act preventively before concrete threats materialise.BfV President Sinan Selen has repeatedly urged and justified this reform. He points out that Germany faces a fundamentally changed hybrid threat environment — particularly from state actors such as Russia, China and Iran. 

Classical, purely observational intelligence gathering is no longer sufficient to counter sabotage of critical infrastructure, disinformation campaigns, espionage and cyber operations. Selen therefore calls for sharper instruments in the preventive domain and emphasises that other European partner services are already significantly more advanced in this area. Without corresponding adjustments, Germany risks falling operationally behind.However, this initiative from Berlin has met with clear criticism from the federal states. The President of the Thuringian Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Stephan Kramer, has issued a strong warning against such a development. “The repeated demand to transform the Office for the Protection of the Constitution into a ‘real secret service’ increasingly irritates and worries me,” Kramer stated. He stresses that the Verfassungsschutz is, for good reason, an intelligence service and must remain so. He firmly rejects any conversion into a kind of “secret service police”. New operational powers must not become executive powers, as the tried and tested information separation principle between intelligence services and police must be preserved.Kramer acknowledges that cyber defence requires updating and sharpening. 

However, active combat or “striking back” against cyber operations does not belong within the remit of the Verfassungsschutz, but should be concentrated elsewhere — for example with the Bundeswehr in the case of defence. He also warns of a potential loss of public trust: such a change in the role of the Verfassungsschutz would alter the concept of a militant democracy “through the back door” and would likely not be desired by the majority of the population.The essential driver of this reform is therefore the significantly altered threat profile of the Federal Republic of Germany. For years, state actors and supporting transnational networks have been conducting targeted operations on German soil. In this environment, a defensive, observation-limited intelligence approach is increasingly reaching its operational limits.At the same time, any expansion of capabilities must remain strictly within the constitutional boundaries of the Federal Republic. This includes the consistent observance of the information separation principle between intelligence services and police, respect for the federal division of competences between the Federation and the states, the fundamental rights binding of any foreign intelligence activities, and the absolute protection of the core area of private life and the IT fundamental right.The area of cyber operations is particularly complex and sensitive. Here a clear tactical-operational conflict line emerges: short-term disruption of adversary infrastructure — such as logical server takedowns, temporary access blocks, targeted modification of malicious code for damage limitation, or operational deception — can significantly complicate or even render impossible long-term, court-proof evidence preservation. 

Therefore, the new powers must be defined with extreme legal precision and clearly separated from police executive measures.Among the specific demands of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution under President Selen are, inter alia, the lowering of thresholds in financial investigations to enable faster preparation of account freezes, the possibility of operational disruption of IT infrastructures, and a significantly expanded and partially automated data exchange between authorities. All these instruments may only be introduced on the basis of clear and detailed legal regulations of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community (BMI). They must be tied to strict parliamentary oversight, judicial approval requirements and narrow data-protection transmission regulations.

[DE]

Die Bundesregierung plant eine Reform der inneren Sicherheitsarchitektur, die dem Verfassungsschutz (BfV) erweiterte präventive operative Befugnisse gegen hybride Bedrohungen einräumen soll. BfV-Präsident Sinan Selen begründet dies mit der gestiegenen Gefahr durch Russland, China und Iran sowie der Unzulänglichkeit rein beobachtender Aufklärung. Er fordert schärfere Instrumente, insbesondere bei Cyber-Operationen und Finanzermittlungen.Deutlichen Widerspruch kommt vom Thüringer LfV-Präsidenten Stephan Kramer. Er warnt vor einer Umwandlung des Verfassungsschutzes in einen „echten Geheimdienst“ mit Exekutivbefugnissen und pocht auf die strikte Einhaltung des informationellen Trennungsgebots. Die Debatte offenbart die zentrale Spannung zwischen notwendigem Fähigkeitsaufwuchs und verfassungsrechtlichen Grundprinzipien.

Information Separation Principle

(Informationelles Trennungsgebot)

Constitutional principle that strictly separates intelligence gathering (by services such as BfV) from police executive powers. It prohibits the direct use of intelligence information for criminal prosecution.

IT Fundamental Right

(IT-Grundrecht)

A basic right established by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2008 guaranteeing the confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems (also known as the “computer fundamental right”).

Core Area of Private Life

(Kernbereich privater Lebensgestaltung)

Absolutely protected sphere of privacy that must not be infringed upon, even by intelligence measures.

Preventive Capability Expansion

(Präventiver Fähigkeitsaufwuchs)

Extension of technical and operational tools for security agencies to disrupt threats in advance (preventively) rather than merely observing them.

Operational Powers

(Operative Befugnisse)

Authorities that go beyond pure information collection and enable active measures, such as disruption of IT infrastructure, server takedowns, or operational deception.

Hybrid Operations

(Hybride Operationen)

Coordinated actions by state actors below the threshold of open warfare, combining sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, espionage, and political influence.

References:

ZEIT online – Verfassungsschutzpräsident fordert mehr Befugnisse für seine Behörde (27. Mai 2026)

SPIEGEL – Verfassungsschutz-Präsident Sinan Selen fordert mehr Befugnisse (27. Mai 2026)

Handelsblatt – Sinan Selen: Verfassungsschutzchef fordert mehr Befugnisse für Behörde (27. Mai 2026)

Süddeutsche Zeitung– Interview mit Sinan Selen: „Wir müssen operativer arbeiten“ (27. Mai 2026)

ZEIT online – Kramer: Kein Umbau zum „Geheimdienst-Polizisten“ nötig (28. Mai 2026)

RedaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland (RND) – Kramer warnt vor Umbau zum „Geheimdienst-Polizisten“ (28. Mai 2026)

Stern – Thüringens Verfassungsschutzchef warnt vor Geheimdienst-Polizei (28. Mai 2026)

Deutschlandfunk – Verfassungsschutz-Präsident fordert Ausweitung von Befugnissen (27./28. Mai 2026)

Tagesspiegel – Selen erwartet mehr Befugnisse für Verfassungsschutz 2026 (aktualisiert 2026)

ZDFheute – Verfassungsschutz bald „echter“ Geheimdienst? (27. Mai 2026)

NOZ – Verfassungsschutz: Selen fordert mehr Befugnisse (27. Mai 2026)