The defense against the Russian ballistic intermediate-range missile (IRBM) Oreshnik—a technological modification of the mobile RS-26 system with a range of up to 5,000 kilometers, a terminal re-entry speed of up to Mach 10, and a MIRV payload architecture—relies on a networked sensor and effector chain starting in the space domain. Satellite-based early warning systems such as the US Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) constellations detect the intense thermal signature of the solid-fuel propulsion system immediately upon launch during the boost phase. This data is processed via NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) at the Allied Air Command in Ramstein to calculate the projected impact sector, leaving a remaining warning time of often under 15 minutes.

For active kinetic engagement during the exoatmospheric mid-course phase, heavy interception systems are utilized to destroy the missile in space via hit-to-kill technology before the six independent re-entry vehicles can separate. Alongside the US Aegis Ashore system in Redzikowo (Poland) and Deveselu (Romania) utilizing Standard Missile-3 (SM-3 Block IIA) interceptors, the Arrow 3 system, developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Boeing, constitutes the central European option to close this exoatmospheric capability gap. Procured under the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), the system is currently being integrated into the European air defense architecture. Serving as a technological advancement for the transition zone between the exo- and endoatmosphere is the Arrow 4 system currently under development in Israel, which is specifically designed to counter advanced, maneuverable ballistic missiles and hypersonic re-entry vehicles.

For the endoatmospheric wide-range and terminal phases, complementary procurement options and European self-developments are focused on the frontline. The Israeli-American David’s Sling system, procured by Finland, covers ranges of up to 300 kilometers. Its Stunner interceptor employs a dual seeker consisting of an actively steered radar and infrared sensor, alongside an impulse motor, to neutralize maneuvering warheads and hypersonic cruise missiles during final descent. This capability is augmented by the modernized European SAMP/T NG system, whose Aster 30 Block 1 NT interceptors are optimized for the endoatmospheric defense against ballistic missiles of the 1,000-kilometer class, while Patriot PAC-3 MSE operates as classic point defense.

 To structurally counter the threat of maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles and next-generation ballistic missiles in the 2030s, a European consortium led by MBDA is developing the Aquila endoatmospheric interceptor under the EDF-funded HYDIS² project. Parallel to this, the French-led PESCO project TWISTER (Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based Theater Surveillance) links space-based infrared sensors with a high-performance endoatmospheric interceptor to neutralize threats exceeding speeds of Mach 5.

Within the offensive warfare domain, the counter-force principle applies, aiming at the preemptive destruction of mobile Russian Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs) in the deep rear before missile launch. Alongside the US Typhon missile system, European nations are establishing their own long-range precision weapons. The development of the ground-launched European cruise missile ELMA (European Long-Range Strike Approach), initiated by Germany, France, Italy, and Poland, targets a range exceeding 1,000 kilometers. This component is complemented by MBDA's British-French FMAN/FMC (Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon) development program, which serves as a radar-optimized successor to Storm Shadow and SCALP, realizing supersonic and hypersonic concepts to eliminate heavily defended strategic enemy targets. As an immediate air-launched option, the Israeli ballistic precision weapons Rampage and Rocks are also available, launched from combat aircraft outside the enemy's air defense envelope and capable of directly engaging mobile missile positions via GPS-independent, electro-optical terminal guidance.

In the domain of Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA), electronic countermeasures focus on disrupting the adversary's C4ISR chains. Because the Oreshnik relies on autonomous Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) during its terminal approach and is largely resistant to classical jamming, offensive cyber operations focus on infiltrating the digital supply chains and software systems of Russian production facilities to induce malfunctions in the guidance electronics. Passive defense entails the structural hardening of strategic installations, military command posts, and logistical nodes via deeply stratified underground facilities, as well as the physical decentralization of supply depots to maintain operational continuity during impacts. At the level of strategic deterrence, the deployment of conventional US intermediate-range weapons in Europe serves to establish a strategic equilibrium, while NATO's extended nuclear deterrence is designed to prevent vertical escalation driven by the dual-use nature of the missile.

[DE]

Ein strategischer Abzug der USA aus Europa gefährdet die Satelliten-Frühwarnung und Verteidigungsfähigkeit gegen komplexe Bedrohungen wie die russische Oreschnik-Mittelstreckenrakete. Um diese Lücke autark zu schließen, setzt Europa auf eine mehrschichtige Abwehrarchitektur. Die exoatmosphärische Abwehr im Weltraum soll primär durch das israelische System Arrow 3 erfolgen, bevor sich die MIRV-Sprengköpfe aufspalten. Für die endoatmosphärische Endphase stehen das israelische System David’s Sling sowie künftige europäische Rüstungsprojekte wie HYDIS² (Interzeptor Aquila) und das PESCO-Projekt TWISTER bereit. Ergänzend sieht die europäische Counter-Force-Doktrin offensive Tiefenschläge mittels weitreichender Präzisionswaffen wie dem geplanten Marschflugkörper ELMA oder dem britisch-französischen FMAN/FMC-Programm vor, um mobile Abschussrampen präventiv im rückwärtigen Raum des Gegners zu zerstören. Passive Härtung und Cyber-Operationen gegen digitale Lieferketten komplettieren den Schutzschirm.

Glossary

IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile; ballistische Mittelstreckenrakete mit einer Reichweite zwischen 3.000 und 5.000 Kilometern.

MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle; Mehrfachsprengköpfe, die sich in der Endphase autonom aufteilen und verschiedene Ziele unabhängig ansteuern können.

Hit-to-Kill Eine Abwehrtechnologie, bei der ein anfliegender Flugkörper durch die reine kinetische Energie des direkten Aufpralls eines Interzeptors ohne explosiven Sprengkopf zerstört wird.

Exoatmosphärisch Außerhalb der Erdatmosphäre stattfindend, typischerweise in Höhen ab 100 Kilometern im erdnahen Weltraum.

Endoatmosphärisch Innerhalb der Erdatmosphäre stattfindend, wo aerodynamische Kräfte und Luftwiderstand auf den Flugkörper wirken.

Counter-Force-Doktrin Eine Militärstrategie, die auf die präventive oder reaktive Vernichtung der militärischen Infrastruktur und der Waffensysteme des Gegners absetzt.

CEMA Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities; integrierte Operationsführung in den Bereichen Cyberabwehr, offensive Cyberoperationen und elektronische Kampfführung.

INS Inertial Navigation System; ein autarkes Trägheitsnavigationssystem, das Beschleunigungs- und Drehratensensoren nutzt und unabhängig von externen Signalen wie GPS funktioniert.

References

NATO Allied Air Command https://ac.nato.int

European Defence Fund https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu

MBDA Missile Systems https://www.mbda-systems.com

PESCO Secretariat https://www.pesco.europa.eu

Israel Aerospace Industries https://www.iai.co.il