Richard Krauss
5. Juli 2025
Intelligence-based analysis of combined
chemical and conventional operations
and implications for NATO
Russia has significantly intensified its use of chemical weapons in Ukraine over the past six weeks. According to consistent reports from Western intelligence services (BND, MIVD, AIVD) and Ukrainian authorities, chloropicrin and CS gas are being used systematically. The number of documented attacks now exceeds 9,000 since the beginning of the invasion, with a notable increase in the current period. At least three deaths and more than 2,500 injuries are directly attributable to chemical agents. The number of unreported cases is high, as many incidents in combat zones cannot be recorded.
Russian units are deliberately deploying chemical substances against Ukrainian positions using drones, artillery, and improvised containers. The aim is to force defenders out of cover and then target them with conventional weapons. Coordination with artillery and infantry attacks has been confirmed. The impact on the morale and discipline of Ukrainian troops is significant.
Chloropicrin is a colorless, volatile liquid with a pungent odor and is classified as a choking agent. Even low concentrations cause irritation of the eyes, respiratory tract, and mucous membranes. Higher exposure can lead to toxic pulmonary edema, which can be fatal. The effects are often delayed, complicating medical treatment. CS gas irritates the eyes, respiratory tract, and skin, forcing soldiers to abandon their positions. The combination of both substances increases the effectiveness of Russian tactics.
Russia’s use of chloropicrin and CS gas violates the Chemical Weapons Convention. The international response has so far been limited to sanctions, diplomatic protests, and increased monitoring.
The use of chemical weapons is systematic and part of a coordinated overall strategy. Chemical weapons are used to weaken defensive positions, force troop movements, and impair Ukraine’s operational capability. Integrating chemical weapons into combined attacks increases the effectiveness of conventional operations.
Ukraine must allocate resources for protective equipment, medical care, and decontamination. This ties up personnel and reduces the capacity for counterattacks. As a result, the Russian side achieves asymmetric superiority.
Russian military leadership and NBC defense units actively support the use of chemical weapons. The use has become routine and is expected to continue.
The threshold for the use of chemical weapons has dropped. Standardization increases the likelihood that similar means will be used in other conflicts or against other states. The risk that chemical agents will also be used outside Ukraine as part of hybrid operations—such as sabotage or attacks—has increased. Precedents such as the Novichok attacks in Salisbury (2018) and against Navalny (2020) show that Russia is willing to use chemical agents on NATO territory as well.
Russia combines the use of chemical weapons with cyberattacks, disinformation, and sabotage against critical infrastructure. Attribution is complicated, and the political response capability of Western states is impaired. The Russian strategy relies on gradual, hard-to-attribute escalation. The goal is to create uncertainty, paralyze decision-making processes, and test the West’s ability to respond.
The threat to Ukraine remains acute: chemical attacks destabilize the front, increase casualties, and hinder defensive capability. The psychological burden on troops increases, and the willingness to defend decreases. The threat to Europe is real: the threshold for the use of chemical weapons in other countries has fallen. The likelihood of targeted, covert operations against critical infrastructure, political opponents, or military targets in Europe has increased.
NATO and the EU have strengthened their CBRN defense, expanded early warning systems, and intensified cooperation. Political cohesion remains fragile, as threat perceptions vary among member states.
A massive chemical weapons attack is less likely than a series of covert, targeted operations that cumulatively cause destabilization and loss of confidence. The risk of a creeping normalization of chemical weapons use is high. Each instance of tolerance increases the likelihood that other actors will cross this threshold. The deterrent effect of international norms is weakened.
Russia’s systematic use of chemical weapons in Ukraine is a violation of international law and a test of Western response capability. The threat is acute, and the risks for Europe and NATO are real and increasing. Without coordinated countermeasures, there is a risk of further lowering the threshold for the use of chemical weapons in Europe.
Sources Directory
Intelligence Services
Federal Intelligence Service (BND, Germany):Joint Disclosure – Russia intensifies its use of chemical weapons in Ukraine (July 4, 2025)
Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD, Netherlands) & General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD, Netherlands):English Defence: Russia further intensifies its use of chemical weapons in Ukraine (July 4, 2025)Dutch Ministry of Defence press release (July 4, 2025)
International Organizations and Expert Networks
OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons):OPCW issues report on third Technical Assistance Visit to Ukraine (June 26, 2025)
CBWNet (Expert Network on Chemical and Biological Weapons):Chemical Weapons Allegations and Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine (2025)
BAFA (Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control, Germany) – Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC):CWC Convention (German)
Glossary
AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst)
Dutch civilian intelligence service for national security and counter-espionage.
BAFA (Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control)
German authority responsible, among other things, for monitoring compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.
CBRN
Abbreviation for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear – collective term for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazardous substances and corresponding protective measures.
CBWNet
Specialist network for chemical and biological weapons, a scientific network for the analysis and evaluation of developments in the field of C/B weapons.
Chloropicrin (Trichloronitromethane, CCl₃NO₂)
Colorless, pungent-smelling liquid, a choking agent, causes severe irritation and pulmonary edema, used as a warfare agent in World War I.
CS gas (2-chlorobenzylidene malonic acid dinitrile)
An irritant, also known as tear gas, causes eye, respiratory, and skin irritation; banned as a chemical weapon in war.
Force Multiplier
Military term for a capability or weapon that disproportionately amplifies the effect of a force or operation.
Hybrid Warfare
Combination of conventional military means and unconventional methods (e.g., cyberattacks, disinformation, sabotage).
Choking Agent
Chemical warfare agent that attacks the respiratory tract and lungs and can lead to respiratory distress and pulmonary edema.
MIVD (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst)
Dutch Military Intelligence Service.
OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons)
International Organization for the Supervision of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Plausible Deniability
A strategy in which responsibility for an action can be credibly denied.
Toxic Pulmonary Edema
Fluid accumulation in the lungs as a result of toxic substances leads to respiratory distress and can be fatal.
Note:
Despite careful evaluation and multi-source comparison, it can never be completely ruled out in an intelligence context that individual pieces of information are subject to deliberate attempts at deception or disinformation campaigns. However, this assessment is based on current, reliable sources and established analytical methods, but does not claim to be absolutely error-free.